**POL 240 / SPIA 312**

**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**Andrew Moravcsik**

**Fall 2022**

This course offers an introduction to international relations (IR) beginning with its pre-history and ending with crises today. It investigates the diverse substantive interests, ideals, and beliefs that motivate foreign-policy makers, the changing balance of geopolitical power and influence, the nature of global institutions, and the non-rational beliefs of decision-makers. This course also aims to strengthen concrete skills designed to be helpful in your future activities, whether reading the daily news feed, designing the strategy of an international company, or advising a president: deploying basic social scientific theory, recalling basic events in the history of world politics, conducting policy analysis, and writing policy memos, opinion pieces and other forms of political communication. An elaboration follows.

**What is this course about?** This course introduces some “big questions” in the study of world politics—and offers some basic answers grounded in history, social science and contemporary policy analysis. Among them: Why do states wage war? When they do, what goals do they seek, what tactics and strategies do they employ, who wins and why? Are nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) a force for peace or a threat to it? What are the biggest WMD threats and how can and should they be regulated and, if so, by whom? What does the rise of new “great powers” (such as China) and the decline of others (such as Russia) mean for global politics today? Why do countries sometimes engage in seemingly ethical, altruistic or enlightened behavior in areas such as free trade, human rights, development assistance and environmental policy—but often not? Why do states sometimes liberalize trade and sometimes prefer protectionism? What are the consequences of this transnational activity for individual states and societies? To what extent are critics of international rules governing trade and finance—including the current and previous President of the United States— correct? Who benefits from economic exchange: developing countries or developed ones, neither or both? When and how can countries act to stabilize the global financial system? Why and when do states cooperate to establish international law and institutions that appear to limit their sovereignty? When and how can states cooperate to provide global collective and common goods, such as a clean environment and stable climate, humanitarian alleviation of suffering, and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction? Are non-governmental organizations (NGOs), terrorist groups, multinational corporations, bloggers and other “non-state actors” rendering the traditional nation-state obsolete? Will the future of world politics be similar to or different from the past? If the latter, what will it be like?

**What skills are developed?** This course also aims to strengthen four concrete skills. First is the ability to deploy basic social scientific theories of world politics to help understand events in world politics. Here the primary focus is on enduring and fundamental theoretical questions. What is power? What is the impact of global interdependence? Can states act rationally to develop strategies and policies to realize their preferences and, if so, when do they do so? If not, how can we explain their behavior? What is the role of international institutions and transnational information flows? The answers to these questions matter not just for scholars, but for everyday practitioners. Students will have the opportunity to hear guest lectures and read works by some of Princeton’s leading IR scholars and to engage them in classroom discussion.

Second is the ability to draw on some (very selective) basic events in the history of world politics from 10,000 BC to the present. These cases help explain how we all got where we are in world politics—and often offer useful analogies to current policy problems. The course is designed, however, so that *all factual material discussed (or examined) in the course is in the lectures and readings.* No prior information or coursework is required—or will be of much use.

Third is to conduct basic policy analysis. The latter half of the course examines contemporary policy issues, such as human rights, terrorism, development, US intervention, and the rise of China. This segment also draws heavily on films, video, and current commentary—and the most current readings (on Afghanistan, for example) appear while we are in class.

Fourth is to engage in professional political communication. Being able to write clear functional prose can be very useful in government and most other large private-sector, civil society, media, or international institutions. Assignments encourage development of a range of practical written skills, including critically reading scholarship, examining primary documents, crafting a professional policy memo, and drafting a journalistic opinion piece--as well as simulating international negotiations and legal processes.

**LOGISTICAL INFORMATION**

**Contact Information:** Professor Moravcsik’s (pronouns: he/him) office is Robertson 443. He may be reached at amoravcs@princeton.edu or 258-1161. Background information is available at www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs. His assistant is Helene Wood, who is at 258-6980 or hwood@princeton.edu. His regular office hours will generally be Monday 1:45-3:00 or by appointment. He welcomes students from outside his precept. The Head Preceptor is Esther Robinson (pronouns: she/her), who can be reached at [estherr@princeton.edu](mailto:estherr@princeton.edu). Biographical information about teaching staff and further contact information are on the course website.

**Course web site:** We will post essential course materials (e.g. syllabus, lecture outlines and handouts, precept information and materials, exam announcements, and links) on Canvas. We will post a lecture outline before each lecture. We will make announcements in lecture and/or by e-mail. Students are responsible for remaining up to date. Please direct all logistical questions concerning policies, precepts and other matters to the Head Preceptor.

**Lectures:**  Lectures take place Monday and Wednesday at 10 a.m.

**Readings:** Nearly all course readings are available through Reserves and Modules on Canvas. Due to copyright, we cannot put all material up on the web, so we recommend that you purchase Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York, 1994) and Thomas Lairson and David Skidmore, *International Political Economy: The Struggle for Power and Wealth* (2017 edition)*.* New and used copies are widely available from on-line sources and the titles have been submitted to Labyrinth Books. You will also find this book on reserve at Firestone library. If any reading is unavailable and the library cannot locate it, please contact the Head Preceptor.

Please note that the average length of readings per week is about 120 pp.—plus the five films and some handouts and background materials for precept simulations. 120 pp. per week is about half the average length of weekly readings in introductory courses in the English or Sociology Departments at Princeton, and about 25% below the average length of weekly readings in introductory courses in the History Department. (It is also, of course, less than the number of pages of text many top policy-makers—or, at least, their staffers—must read for a single meeting, let alone in a single day.) It is, however, longer than the length of readings in most introductory courses in the Princeton Politics Department, since this course often assigns descriptive and interpretive historical and policy readings, more like those one would encounter in a History class, alongside social scientific articles and chapters. Full precept participation and optimal performance on the final exam require that students master this material. Anyone concerned about the workload should make an informed decision about whether they want to accept this burden; the course staff would be happy to discuss this with you.

**Films:** Five films are required as regular readings. Precepts will discuss them and they will appear on the final examination. All will be made available through Canvas.

**A Trigger Warning:** With regard to this material, please consider this warning: *the lectures, readings, slides, films and discussions in POL 240 contain viscerally disturbing and politically unpopular images, sounds and written descriptions.* This is inevitable, because world politics is a tough business: vivid, horrifying and repugnant episodes of war, violence, oppression, exploitation, poverty, intolerance, injustice, racism and chauvinism play a central role. The first reading and the opening minutes of the first lecture, for example, address the subjugation and extermination of the indigenous peoples of the Americas. Just a few of the other events we examine include European imperialism, World War I, Nazi genocide, atomic warfare, the Vietnam War, mass human rights violations on every continent, and, in the final lectures and readings, some of the mass atrocities that surround us today. It would be surprising if anyone were *not* troubled by readings, slides, lectures and discussions of this material. Yet direct confrontation with such events—and with diverse interpretations of those events—helps us grasp what is really at stake in world politics. Since the Princeton student body is diverse and this potentially troubling material is varied, it is impractical to predict which specific items will prove troubling to certain individuals. If students are troubled by this material, they may temporarily step out of any lecture—attendance at precepts remains mandatory, however, since all students will have presumably done the readings and thus are fully aware what can be discussed. Moreover, the course staff is available to discuss such issue with the instructional staff, as are general Princeton University support services. Finally, we want to make clear that inclusion among readings, films or lectures does not in any way imply that the instructors sympathize with specific motivations described or theories or interpretations contained in them.

**Requirements:** Precepts begin meeting ***the second week of class***. They will meet weekly for 50 minutes. Participation, which is mandatory and graded, includes active involvement in discussions, simulations, occasional small assignments and pop quizzes. There will be no precept during the midterm week. A 5-day take-home midterm exam is scheduled during midterm week and an in-class final exam at the assigned university time. In addition, two short (maximum 1000 words) papers will be due during the term: the first is a scholarly analysis of readings, the second either a policy memo or an “op-ed” piece. Students may elect to write a third (optional) paper analyzing the current global balance of influence. Due to senior thesis constraints, seniors may elect not to take the midterm. Other small precept assignments must be completed as well. In light of recent scholarship (conducted at Princeton University) suggesting the pedagogical utility of this rule, *students may not use* *computers or phones in precept*. Note that the syllabus pairs each lecture with a set of study questions that should be part of your preparation for reading, precept discussion, papers and exams. Precepts will be assigned promptly during the first days of the semester. Students may not change their precept assignments without prior approval by staff, which is only given for exceptional, sound and fully documented reasons.

**Exam Times and Procedures:** The midterm will be posted on the course website at the start of midterm week. The final exam will take place at a time and place during the exam period in December set by the university.

**Communication:** Please start the SUBJECT line of ALL course-related emails with “POL240:”

**Grading and Absence Policy:** The final exam counts for 30% of the final grade, the mid-term 20%, the first response paper 10%, the policy memo or op-ed 15%, various precept assignments and pop quizzes 5%, and fully prepared precept participation 20%. An optional third paper provides students with an opportunity to average an additional grade to their two paper grades into the precept participation grade: for this purpose, they can complete whichever second written assignment (either a memo or an op-ed) they did not already submit.

The precept participation grade is based on the following elements: demonstrating command of all the assigned readings, full oral participation and active involvement in class, and completion of any additional small written assignments connected with the precept. Unexcused absences, nonparticipation, minimal involvement, uninformed or casual participation, and failure to complete small written assignments in precept will count against the participation grade.

Any student who does not complete any major portion of the course without a “documented excuse” (see below) *automatically fails the course*, regardless of grades on other work. This means students fail if they *either:* (1) do not take the midterm*, or* (2) do not take the final, *or* (3) fail to complete any single one of the writing assignments, *or* (4) are absent from three or more precepts without fully documented excuses of the types outlined below.

Grading of exams and papers occurs in consultation with other preceptors and faculty to ensure uniformity. Individual preceptors are thus forbidden to change any grade, except in case of simple arithmetic error. (In the spirit of university rules on final grades, which state: “Grade changes are approved only to correct a miscalculation or a data entry error and should not be used as a mechanism to address student grade appeals.”) Otherwise, a grade can be changed if and only if: (a) the student submits in writing a specific reason to believe the grade is biased, and (b) the exam or paper in question is then re-graded by a third party without knowledge of the student’s complaint or the previous grade. If re-graded, the grade may rise or fall—and the new grade is final. Any students who wish to invoke this option must contact the Head Preceptor with written reason(s) why they believe reconsideration is justified.

This course follows thePolitics Department’s standard penalty on late work of 1/3 letter grade per 24-hour period or any part thereof—except exams, which must, of course, be submitted on time to be graded. That means a B+ becomes a B, etc. Technical problems are the responsibility of the student.

Please familiarize yourself with Princeton’s Honor Code as well as its rules on plagiarism. These are available at http://www.princeton.edu/pub/rrr/index.xml. We will not investigate suspected violations in detail, but rather turn them over to the appropriate university administrator in accordance with Princeton University policy.

**Excuses:** Unless university policy explicitly mandates otherwise, the only acceptable “documented excuses” are:

1. **Medical.** The student (or an immediate family member) suffers from a medical condition of sufficient severity to make completion of the work impossible, if and only if accompanied by documentation from a medical professional (or the equivalent) both stating explicitly the medical condition andattesting to its sufficient severity so as to preclude work (i.e., a “I was seen at McCosh” note is *not* sufficient).

1. **Religious.** A religious holiday, accompanied by documentation that the student is actually observing that holiday in a way that prevents work, to the extent explicitly acknowledged by university rules.

Sports events, artistic activities, public service, travel of a personal professional or academic nature, family celebrations, non-medical family circumstances, and computer problems are not valid excuses.

Moreover, any valid excuse listed above based on a mitigating circumstance known to the student before a deadline or session in question, including those listed above, must be approved by the preceptor at least *three days in advance*. As in the worlds of scholarship, policy and journalism, tardiness and technical difficulties are the responsibility of the writer.

# SUMMARY OF KEY ASSIGNMENTS AND DATES

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| ***First Week of Class*** | **First precept meeting:** This takes place during the second week of semester. |
| ***Weeks 2-5*** | **1st Assignment:** This is a “ResponsePaper.” It analyzes at least two of the readings assigned that week. It should be no more than 1000 words long. During the first precept, students will be asked to sign up for a week from 2 through 5 (subject to an even distribution of papers across the week). The paper is due by e-mail attachment to the preceptor and to all students in the precept by 5 pm the day before the corresponding precept meets (if the time of the precept is changed, the new time dictates the deadline). Late assignments will be graded down. For more information, please see the course handout on the response paper assignment. |
| ***Weeks 2-5*** | **Small Classroom Assignments:** Each week may involve a small classroom assignment, ranging from one/two paragraphs of writing to preparing a simulation. Students will also receive a handout with study questions and key term identifications. There may also be small quizzes based on the provided study questions and key term identifications. |
| ***Midterm Week*** | **Take-homeMidterm:** The exam will contain one broad essay question. It will be distributed on Monday, 10 October, at 9:00 pm and due by e-mail on Friday, 14 October, at 12:00 noon. |
| ***7 Nov/1 Dec*** | **2nd Written Assignment:** This is a policy memo in response to a contemporary international issue of the student’s choosing. A topic proposal is due to the Preceptor in the body of an e-mail on Monday, 7 November. In a few paragraphs, the proposal should summarize the type of document (policy memo or op-ed), a summary of the basic thesis, the possible alternative positions, and the type and source of evidence and analysis the student plans to utilize in advancing the thesis. This is a required assignment, which must be submitted on time.    Assignment is due to the preceptor by e-mail attachment on Thursday, 1 December at noon.Students should address their policy memo to a particular decision-maker within a national government, a leading NGO, or a private corporation, and recommend a policy choice with regard to an issue.    For more information, see the assignment and course handout entitled “How to Write a Policy Memo.” |
| ***Weeks 7-12*** | **Small Classroom Assignments:** Each week may involve a small classroom assignment, ranging from one/two paragraphs of writing to preparing a simulation. Students will also receive a handout with study questions and identifications. There may also be small quizzes based on the provided study questions and key term identifications. |
| ***13 December*** | **Optional 3nd Written Assignment Due:**A 1000-word paper answering the following question: “Which major countries and groups are growing more influential and less influential in world affairs today? How and why? What |

does this tell us about different IR theories in the 21st century?” This paper is due Tuesday, 13 December, at noon, via e-mail attachment to your preceptor. Late assignments will be graded down. This grade will be averaged in with the first two paper grades. (NB: This assignment is optional.)

***Date TBA* Final:** The final will be held on the date designated by the university for this course. It will be a closed-book exam containing between 12-25 short identification questions (i.e. concepts, names, places, events from the course for students to identify and situate); some longer essay questions covering the entire course (but with slightly more focus on the second half); and perhaps some other elements. Students will have some choice about which questions they answer.

# LECTURES AND TOPICS

**Date Lecture**

**W 9/7** *Veni, Vidi, Vici:* The First 50,000 Years

**M 9/12** Power and Rationality: The Peloponnesian War, Realism, Non-Rational Theory

**W 9/14** Ideological Conflict: The Concert of Europe and Liberal Theory

**M 9/19** International Institutions and IR Theory

**W 9/21** Political Economy: Britain from Mercantilism to *Laissez-Faire*

**M 9/26** Empire: 19th-century European Expansion

**W 9/28** The Causes and Conduct of the “Great War”

**M 10/3** Making the World Safe for Democracy: Woodrow Wilson

**W 10/5** Political Causes and Consequences of the Great Depression

**W 10/5 (Time TBD)** *Review Session* for the Midterm

**M 10/10** Rationality, Ideology and the Origins of World War II

### \*\*\* Fall Break \*\*\*

**M 10/24** The Post-War “Bretton Woods” System

**W 10/26** Trade Today: Free or Fair?

**M 10/31** Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Cold War

**W 11/2** High-Tech Warfare Today: Cyber, AI and Biotech

**M 11/7** Vietnam: Why Do Big States Lose Small Wars?

**W 11/9** Intervention in the 21st century: Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ukraine

**M 11/14** The International Politics of Development

**W 11/16** Protecting the Global Environment

**M 11/21** Terrorism

**M 11/28** The Protection of Human Rights

**W 11/30** Managing Modern Power Transitions: China’s Rise and Russia’s Decline

**M 12/5** NO LECTURE

**W 12/7** The Future of World Politics (*Faculty Panel with Princeton professors*)

**W 12/7 (Time TBD)** *Review Session* for the Final Exam

# READING

## W 9/7 VENI, VIDI, VICI: ANARCHY AND WAR IN THE FIRST 50,000 YEARS

(34 pp.)

*Why do the first 50,000 years of recorded human history seem to witness devastating interstate and inter-civilizational warfare? What assumptions and causal mechanisms does Diamond use to explain the causes (and consequences) of such wars? What set of assumptions and causal mechanisms might allow us to generalize this account into a coherent “realist” family of theories (a “paradigm”) that explains conflict and cooperation more generally? What do such theories predict? What does it mean for a state to seek “hegemony”? Do realist theories explain conflict—or just domination? Do you find such “realist” theories of conflict and cooperation compelling? How is world politics today realist or non-realist?*

Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies* (1999)*,* pp. 67-81, 85-92. (23 pp.)

John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security* 19: 3 (1994-1995), *read only* pp. 9-12. (4 pp.)

John Mearsheimer, “Chapter 2: Anarchy and the Struggle for Power," and “The American Pursuit of Hegemony,” in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (University of Chicago Press, “*updated” 2014 edition only*!), *as edited for this course.* pp. 40-42, 365-368. (7 pp.)

## M 9/12 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR: REALISM OR NON-RATIONALITY? (70 pp.)

*How does Thucydides explain the causes and conduct of the Peloponnesian War? What evidence does he offer to support a “realist” interpretation of the war? What does the “rationalist” or “bargaining” theory of war assume about state behavior and how does it explain outbreak and conduct? When should we see war and how should it be conducted? Is this account realist? To what extent do (and don’t) the Ancient Greek decision-makers Thucydides describes act rationally? What evidence helps us understand this? To the extent they did not, what would be an alternative non-rational explanation of the causes and conduct of the war? What theoretical assumptions and causal mechanisms could we posit to render this account into a coherent and generalizable theoretical account? Do you think statesmen today are more, less or just as rational as those in Ancient Greece? What are some analogies that might be made between Ancient Greek politics and world politics today? How useful are they?*

Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War,* selections in illustrated typescript. (49 pp.)

John T. Rourke, “Foreign Policy,” in Rourke, International Relations on the World Stage 11th edition (McGraw-Hill, 2007), *as edited for this course*. (14 pp.)

Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon, “Why Hawks Win,” *Foreign Policy* (January-February 2007), pp. 34-38. (5 pp)

Kevin Morrell, “Before There Was Trump, There Was Cleon,” *White House Chronicle* (25 January 2017). Available at: http://whchronicle.com/before-there-was-trump-therewas-cleon/ (2 pp.)

## W 9/14 THE CONCERT OF EUROPE: WHAT CAUSES PEACE AND SECURITY COOPERATION? (91 pp.)

*How and why did states in 19th century Europe cooperate to avoid major wars from 1815 to 1848 (and beyond)? Why did they settle major disputes rather than fight? Why did European great powers become less peaceful and cooperative after 1848? What does the historical evidence tell us about the role of anarchy and relative power in explaining this? What does Kissinger mean by “Realpolitik” and is it the same as “realist” theory as we defined it in this course? Were states generally acting instrumentally or rationally? What was the role of changing state preferences based on varied national interests, ideals, and domestic institutions? What assumptions and causal mechanisms might allow us to render the latter account into a “liberal” paradigm that helps explain conflict and cooperation more generally?*

Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (1994), pp. 78-95, 103-129, and 137-167. (76 pp.)

Andrew Moravcsik, “Liberal Theories of International Relations,” mimeo. (15 pp.)

## M 9/19 IR THEORY: REALIST, NON-RATIONAL, LIBERAL, AND INFORMATIONAL “PARADIGMS” (62 pp.)

*According to Kissinger (see readings of 9/13) and the lectures, what explicit international norms and institutions did statesmen create under the Concert of Europe? What was their role in fostering peace and cooperation? What assumptions and causal mechanisms could we posit to render this a general paradigm to explain conflict and cooperation? How do IR scholars like Keohane explain the creation and consequences of international institutions? What are the roles of information and expectations in this paradigm? What do institutions add to an explanation based on power and preferences? How might other families of theories explain the construction and consequences of international institutions? Empirically, what does the evidence suggest about how much this informational paradigm adds to other paradigms, such as those based on coercive power, preferences, and non-rationality in explaining 19th century Europe? Do the various types of theories we have studied in the first two weeks work better in tandem? If so, how might they be combined without simply concluding anything might matter anytime and anyplace?*

Jeffry Frieden, David Lake and Kenneth Schultz, *World Politics: Interests, Interactions, Institutions* (2010), pp. 62-72. (11 pp.)

David A. Lake, “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist

Explanations of the Iraq War,” *International Security* 35:3 (2010-2011), pp. 17-23 (5 pp.)

Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political -Economy* (2005 reprint), pp. 65-69, 80-84, 85-97 (23 pp.).

Kelebogile Zvobgo and Meredith Loken, “Why Race Matters in International Relations” (as edited for this course, 7 pp.)

Handout: “POL 240 Theory Handout” (16 pp.).

## W 9/21 BRITAIN FROM MERCANTILISM TO *LAISSEZ FAIRE*: WHY DO STATES OPEN OR CLOSE THEIR ECONOMIES TO TRADE? (28 pp.)

*What is the standard “comparative advantage” theory of free trade? What does it assume? Why does it lead to the conclusion that free trade, even if pursued*

*unilaterally, is to the advantage of every country? According to Smith, Hamilton, and Lairson/Skidmore, what are some classic 18th and 19th century reasons why adjusting to comparative advantage might not be in the general interest of a country? Under what conditions might the distributional consequences of adjusting to comparative advantage trigger intense domestic and international political conflict? How do the Stolper-Samuelson and Heckscher-Olin theories help us understand this process? How does the case of British trade liberalization in the 1830-50 period and the spread of free trade to the Continent in the 1860s and 70s illustrate these points? Why, on the other hand, might this case be exceptional?*

Adam Smith, “The Wealth of Nations," in Zahariadis, ed., *Contending Perspectives in International Political Economy,* pp. 3-5. (3 pp.)

Alexander Hamilton, “Report on Manufactures," George Crane and Abla

Amawi, eds. *The Theoretical Evolution of International Political Economy,* pp. 37-41. (4 pp.)

Mark Brawley, "The Politics of Trade,” pp. 145-152 ONLY, and “The Repeal of the Corn Laws,” pp. 197-206 in *Turning Points*. (15 pp.)

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence,* 3rd (2001), pp. 5-10. (6 pp.)

## M 9/26 BRITISH IMPERIALISM: WHAT IS AN EMPIRE AND HOW DOES ONE FUNCTION? (78 pp.)

*What is an empire? How do “formal” and “informal” empires differ? What are some of the basic motivations for states to form each type of empire? Which paradigms of IR theory seem most useful in explaining such empires? Can we generalize this view? What is the most important evidence that tells us how well these various explanations account for conduct of British foreign policy in the 19th century? How have European and European-settler societies benefitted from imperialism and slavery? What were the primary motivations in Britain for stepping in to curb slavery in its empire? What were the practical and ethical trade-offs involved in doing so? What might this tell us about how best to promote human rights, environmental protection and other ethically-justified causes in world politics? Should we pay off those who pollute, commit human rights violations or commit crimes? Does the US today run an empire? If so, how do we know and what type of empire is it?*

Myriam François, “It’s not just Cambridge University—all of Britain benefited from slavery,” *The Guardian* (7 May 2019), available at:

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/07/cambridge-universitybritain-slavery (4 pp.)

Tony Smith, “The Dynamics of Imperialism," in *Pattern of Imperialism*, pp. 15-49. (35 pp.)

Adam Hochschild, *Bury the Chains* (2005)*,* pp. 3-8, 62-65, 333-349. (27 pp.)

Bronwen Everill, “Why the World’s Governments Should Pay Polluters: Britain’s

Decision to Compensate Slaveholders was Unjust, Unpalatable—and Effective,” *Foreign Policy* (13 August 2021). (3 pp.)

Michael Ignatieff, “The Burden,” *The New York Times* (5 January 2003), *as edited for*

*this course*. (9 pp.)

## W 9/28 THE CAUSES AND CONDUCT OF THE “GREAT WAR” (80 pp.)

*What explains the outbreak of a general European war in 1914—exactly 100 years after the last one ended? If more than one cause played a role, how do the various causes interact? Which were most important? How well does the bargaining/ rationalist theory of war explain what happened? What do these causes tell us about the relative importance of different paradigms of IR theory? In what sense was the war “accidental” and in what sense not? Was it inevitable? If not, who could or should have done what to avoid it, consistent with the underlying national interests and relative power? Is the outbreak and conduct of WW1 consistent with the rationalist/bargaining theory of war?*

Henry Kissinger, “A Political Doomsday Machine," in *Diplomacy*, pp. 168-217. (50 pp.)

Robert Jervis, “Offense, Defense and the Security Dilemma," in Art and Jervis,

*International Politics* **6th edition** (2003), pp. 153-173. (20 pp.)

**Review**

The 5 pp. of the Lake reading from 9/19. (This is not on WW1 but we encourage you to apply the “bargaining theory of war” approach to this case.)

## Primary Documents

“F.O. 371/257 Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany,” [The Crowe Memorandum], 1 January 1907, as edited for this class. (5 pp.)

“England and the German Naval Fleet," Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (1920). (5 pp.)

## M 10/3 WOODROW WILSON AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: THE LIBERAL VISION OF WORLD ORDER (71 pp.)

*What was Woodrow Wilson’s proposed plan for peace in 1917 and at the Versailles Conference? What was Wilson’s underlying “theory” of world politics? In particular, what did Wilson mean when he called on Americans and others to “make the world safe for democracy”? What is “democratic peace theory” and to what extent does it seem theoretically and empirically plausible? What was the position of the opposition to Wilson in France, Britain and the US? How much of what Wilson proposed was enacted? Did his plan fail and, if so, why? Could or should he have proposed something more effective, given existing power, interests, and information?*

Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy,* “The New Face of Diplomacy (conclusion only)," “The

Dilemmas of the Victors," and “Stresemann and the Re-emergence of the Vanquished," pp. 239-245, 246-265, 266-287. (48 pp.)

Nils Peter Gleditsch, “Democracy and Peace,” in Gleditsch, *Pioneers in the Analysis of*

*War and Peace. Springer Briefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice*, vol 29. Springer Press, pp. 61-71, as edited for this course. (6 pp.)

**Review**

Moravcsik, “Liberal Theories of IR," from Week 2.

## Primary Documents

Woodrow Wilson, Speeches: “Peace Without Victory” (22 January 1917); “War

Message to Congress” (2 April 1917); “Fourteen Points," (8 January 1918). (17 pp.)

## W 10/5 THE POLITICS OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION: WHY DID STATES RESPOND TO ECONOMIC CRISIS WITH AUSTERITY AND PROTECTIONISM? (51 pp.)

*What makes international financial systems vulnerable? How do countries respond to financial shocks? What were the international causes of the Great Depression? What was the optimal international policy response and to what extent did countries follow it? What were the consequences for international security, domestic politics, and global diplomacy? To what extent are things the same or different today?*

Thomas Lairson and David Skidmore, *International Political Economy,* pp. 30-39; 108-113, 253-271. (33 pp.)

Charles Kindleberger, “An Explanation of the 1929 Depression," in *The World in Depression, 1929-1939* (1986)*,* pp. 288-305. (18 pp.)

## *W 10/5* PRE-MIDTERM REVIEW SESSION

***TIME TBD***

*A brief logistical introduction and students should come armed with substantive questions.*

## M 10/10 RATIONALITY AND IDEOLOGY IN THE CAUSE OF WAR: EXPLAINING HITLER’S AND TOJO’S WARS (60 pp.)

*Theoretically, how do we distinguish realist, ideational liberal and non-rational*

*accounts of the actions of Hitler and his counterparts in other countries, and their consequences? According to the best evidence, was Hitler a conventional realist, irrational maniac, or canny extremist? What are the implications for how Hitler could and should have been opposed effectively, given the constraints imposed by relative power, national interests and information at the time? Given this, whose fault was World War II? Ask the same questions about the leaders of the US and Japan? Should we be worried about the rise of a new Hitler today? If so, where and what should be done about it?*

Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy,* “The End of Illusion," “The Nazi-Soviet Pact” (selections only), pp. 288-318, 350-355, 365-368. (38 pp.)

John Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2014 revised edition), pp. 209-224. (15 pp.)

***Primary Documents:***

“Hossbach Memorandum” (10 November 1937), available at:

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/hossbach.asp (7 pp.).

**M 10/10 TAKE-HOME MIDTERM DISTRIBUTED (11 AM)**

## F 10/14 TAKE-HOME MIDTERM DUE (NOON)

***\*\*\* FALL BREAK \*\*\****

## M 10/24 THE “BRETTON WOODS” SYSTEM: HOW AND WHY CAN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS HELP STATES COOPERATE? (49 pp.)

*What explains the advent of formal international economic cooperation in trade and finance after World War II—a system that has persisted, with substantial reforms, until the present? What was the basic purpose of this “Bretton Woods” system? What were the rules and how did they work? How did international institutions help it function? What precise functions did they have? Why was this arrangement enduring and successful? Who gained and lost the most from the creation of this system?**Why does Mearsheimer believe institutions have so little effect? Do you buy his critique?*

Lairson and Skidmore, *International Political Economy*, pp. 113-123. (11 pp.)

Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony* (1984), pp. 98-106, 136-150. (23 pp.)

John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security* 19: 3 (1994-1995), *as edited for this course,* pp. 7-9, 12-24. (15 pp.)

## W 10/26 FREE OR FAIR? THE NEW POLITICS OF TRADE (60 pp.)

*What is at stake in contemporary debates over trade in the US? In China? In Europe? In the developing world? How and why have the challenges facing the international trading regime changed in recent years? What is “fair” trade and how does it differ from “free” trade? Fair for whom and free from what? In addition to the considerations discussed in the readings and lecture of 9/20, what are some 21st century reasons why trade may not be in the national interest? What are some of the distributional consequences that arise: who benefits and who loses from “freer” or “fairer” trade? How do these general and distributional considerations help explain why more overt polarization exists today between those who favor free and “fair” trade in industrialized countries today than did fifty years ago--but less than existed 150 years ago? What are “trade and” debates and what political consequences do they have?*

**Materials on the Globalization Backlash:**

Lairson and Skidmore, *International Political Economy*, Ch. 5, pp. 145-180. (35 pp.)

Douglas Irvin, “The Truth About Trade: What Critics Get Wrong About the Global Economy,” *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2016). (pp. 87-95 ONLY) (8 pp.)

Dani Rodrik, “Why Doesn’t Everyone Get the Case for Free Trade?” (typescript as edited for this course) from *The Globalization Paradox* (2018). (11 pp.)

“Trade and the Environment: Editorial,” *New York Times* (19 January, 2014). (1 p.)

**Materials on US-China Trade Dispute:**

“25 American Products that Rely on Huge Protective Tariffs to Survive,” *Business Insider* (27 September 2010). *Skim list.* (http://www.businessinsider.com/americasbiggest-tariffs-2010-9#

“Explainer: Who pays Trump’s tariffs, China or U.S. customers and companies?” May 6 2019. *Reuters.* <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-tariffs-explainer/who-pays-trumps-tariffs-china-or-u-s-customers-and-companies-idUSKCN1SR1UI> (3 pp.)

“Briefing: Joe Biden is determined that China should not displace America: His China policy is looking even tougher than Donald Trump’s,” *The Economist* (17 July 2021). https://www-economist-com.ezproxy.princeton.edu/briefing/2021/07/17/joe-biden-isdetermined-that-china-should-not-displace-america (2 pp.)

## M 10/31 WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: FORCE FOR PEACE OR TARGET FOR ABOLITION? (70 pp.)

*In what ways do nuclear weapons (weapons of mass destruction) fundamentally change the nature of war? Should they change the way we think about the effects of factors like the balance of power, the preferences of states, information and nonrational decision-making? Under what circumstances do they enhance or degrade deterrence of conventional war? Under what conditions are they a cost-effective tool of statecraft? How might the introduction of uncertainty alter the calculation and trade-offs decision-makers face? What was the US strategy in the Cold War?**Why did nuclear weapons seem like a good way to achieve it? Fifteen years after that strategy was set, how close did we get to nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis—and why? Whose fault was it? Should we abolish nuclear weapons and, if so, how? Or is the existence of low levels of nuclear weapons or massive numbers of nuclear weapons (the status quo) preferable?*

***Film***: *Thirteen Days*, directed by Roger Donaldson (2000).

Ernest May, “*Thirteen Days* in 145 Minutes," *American Prospect* (7 November 2001) (2 pp.)

Thomas Schelling,“The Manipulation of Risk,” *Arms and Influence* (1966), Ch. 3, pp. 92-125 *as edited for this course*. (19 pp.)

Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, “The Great Debate: Is Nuclear Zero the Best Option?" *The National Interest* (Sept/Oct 2010), (4 parts: Sagan Says Yes, Waltz Says No, Sagan Responds, Waltz Responds) (9 pp.)

Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict.” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 10:5 (2016), pp. 31-42. Available at: www.jstor.org/stable/26271621. (12 pp.)

Benjamin Schwarz, “The Real Cuban Missile Crisis,” *The Atlantic* (January/February 2013). Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/01/the-realcuban-missile-crisis/309190/ (11 pp.)

John Feng, “Could China Use Nuclear Weapons in War Over Taiwan?” June 2, 2022. https://www.newsweek.com/china-taiwan-war-nuclear-weapons-1712332 (3 pp.)

## Primary Documents

George Kennan (“Mr. X”), “Sources of Soviet Conduct (abridged)," *Foreign Affairs* (1951), Available at:

https://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp\_textbook\_print.cfm?smtid=3&psid=3629 (3 pp.)

“The Novikov Telegram," Sept. 27, 1946. (5 pp.)

“April 17, 1950 Summary of NSC-68," pp. 1-6. (6 pp.)

## W 11/2 NEW TECHNOLOGIES: AI, CYBER AND BIOTECH (98 pp.)

*What emerging technologies do you think pose the greatest threats to U.S. national security? The national security of other countries? What issues introduced by these new technologies should be prioritized in America’s military and defense strategy? That of other countries? More generally, how will new technologies change the balance of power in international politics (and do different technologies have the same effect)? How will new technologies impact preferences, information and non-rational decision-making? What is the likely role of international norms and institutions in regulating new technologies? How much does the advent of disinformation campaigns waged by countries like Russia and China support different conventional paradigmatic theories of world politics?*

Nick Bostrom, “The Vulnerable World Hypothesis,” *Global Policy* 10:4 (November 2019). (22 pp.)

Eric Schmidt, Henry Kissinger, Daniel Huttenlocher, *The Age of AI and our Human Future* (New York: Little Brown, 2021), pp. 129-146. (18 pp.)

Douglas Frantz, “We’ve Unleashed AI. Now We Need a Treaty to Control It,” Los Angeles Times (16 July 2018). (2 pp.)

Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss, “The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin

Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money” (Institute of Modern Russia Paper, 2017). *Read only* Executive Summary (pp. 6-7), the Kremlin Toolkit (pp. 14-23), and Ukraine and the Advent of Non-linear War (pp. 29-33). Available at: [https://imrussia.org/media/pdf/Research/Michael\_Weiss\_and\_Peter\_Pomerantsev\_\_Th e\_Menace\_of\_Unreality.pdf](https://imrussia.org/media/pdf/Research/Michael_Weiss_and_Peter_Pomerantsev__Th%20e_Menace_of_Unreality.pdf) (16 pp.)

Jared Cohen, “How to Prevent a Cyberwar,” *The New York Times,* August 11, 2017. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/11/opinion/cyberwar-cybersecurityrussia-us.html (1 p.)

Chyba, C. F. and A. L. Greninger (2004). "Biotechnology and Bioterrorism: An Unprecedented World." *Survival* 46(2): 143-162. (20 pp.)

**Primary Document:**

Executive Office of the President, President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, “Letter on Biodefense” (November 2016). (19 pp.)

<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_biodefense_letter_report_final.pdf>

## M 11/7 LIMITED WAR IN THE 20TH CENTURY: WHY DO BIG COUNTRIES FIGHT (AND SO OFTEN LOSE) SMALL WARS? (45 pp.)

*What is a “limited” war and what limits it? What are the implications of limited war*

*for modern warfare? While wars between great powers have vanished since the mid20th century, what motivates big countries to fight small wars against (or in) small countries? What motivates small powers or groups within them to take on great ones? Why do great powers (increasingly) lose most such wars? How might theories drawn from the various paradigms of IR explain these observations? In what sense do you think states and/or their leaders generally act rationally? What does the best evidence about Vietnam tell us about these questions? What should be the “lessons of Vietnam”?*

**Film:** *The Fog of War*, Robert McNamara, directed by Errol Morris, 2003, 107 mins.

Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy,* “The Dilemma of Containment: The Korean War,” (selections), pp. 473-483. (10 pp.)

Leslie Gelb, “Vietnam: The System Worked,” *Foreign Policy* 3 (Summer 1971), 140-

67. (28 pp.)

Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, “Lessons from the Past: The American Record on

Nation-Building,” *Policy Brief* 24 (Carnegie Endowment, 2003), pp. 1-7. (7 pp.)

**M 11/9 LIMITED WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY: DO GREAT POWERS LEARN?**

(103 pp.)

*How are limited wars fought by the US and other countries today the same or different than those fought earlier? Have such countries learned the “lessons” of Vietnam and decolonization? Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, why has the number of conflicts in which the US (and other major Western countries) are involved increased? What does the US seek to achieve? Are these goals realistic? Why did the US and its NATO allies, like the Soviet Union and British before them, lose (or, at least not win) wars such as that in Afghanistan? What should they have done in Afghanistan? What types of theories do you think best explain the causes and conduct of such wars? What explains the timing of the final withdrawal this year? Was it a good decision? Given the decision to withdraw at this time, was the withdrawal well-managed? If not, why not?*

Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” *Foreign Affairs* (1990-91), pp. 23-33. (10 pp)

Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, May 1, 1993. (9 pp.)

David A. Lake, “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist

Explanations of the Iraq War,” *International Security* 35:3 (2010-2011), pp. 7-17, 1920, 23-27, 28-43, 45-48, 50-51, *as edited for this course*. (38 pp.)

Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond* (2001), pp. 3-5, 161-175. (17 pp.)

**Review:** Michael Ignatieff, “American Empire: The Burden,” from 9/22 readings.

**Documents and Reportage on Afghanistan**

Briefing: From Saigon to Kabul: what America’s Afghan fiasco means for the world. *The Economist*. (Aug 21, 2021). (7 pp.) <https://www.economist.com/briefing/2021/08/21/from-saigon-to-kabul-what-americas-afghan-fiasco-means-for-the-world>

Fintan O’Toole, “The Lie of Nation-Building,” *The New York Review of Books* (7 October 2021). (9 pp.) <https://www-nybooks-com.ezproxy.princeton.edu/articles/2021/10/07/afghanistan-lie-nation-building>

Rory Stewart, “The Last Days of Intervention: Afghanistan and the Delusions of Maximalism,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2021). (13 pp.)

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2021-10-08/last-days-intervention>

## M 11/14 THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT (103 pp.)

*What is the development gap? How do modernization and dependency theories respectively explain the development gap? Are the development experiences of industrialized countries relevant for other countries’ prospects for development? Which have been the development strategies of developing countries? How have international financial institutions constrained these strategies? What is the*

*Washington Consensus and which are its main critiques? Has foreign aid contributed to development? What role should international institutions play in development? What is the role of debt financing in the economic development process? What are its advantages and disadvantages?*

**Film:** *Life and Debt*, directed by Stephanie Black, 2001, 80 mins.

Lairson and Skidmore, *International Political Economy,* pp. 189-231 (42 pp.)

Jeffrey Sachs, “The End of Poverty,” *Time* (14 March 2005). (5 pp.)

Angus Deaton, *The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality* (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 2013), pp. 267-307. (40 pp.).

Joseph Stiglitz, “Is There a Post-Washington Consensus Consensus?" in Narcis Serra and Joseph Stiglitz, eds., *The Washington Consensus Reconsidered* (2008), pp. 41-56. (16 pp.)

Watch video on International comparison: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/video/2017/02/01/icp-tutorial-video-1>

**W 11/16 PROTECTING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: WHY SO DIFFICULT?**

(25 pp.)

*Why do some efforts to organize international environmental cooperation succeed and some fail? What are the implications for climate change? Who wins and who loses from allowing or mitigating climate change?*

Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons," *Science* 162:3859 (13 December 1968), pp. 1243-1248. (6 pp.)

Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, “The Development of Environmental Regimes: Nine Case Studies,” in Porter and Brown, eds., *Global Environmental Politics*, (1996), pp. 67-81, 105, *as edited for this course.* (16 pp.)

Philip Stephens. July 29 2021. Climate change is a global threat demanding national solutions. *Financial Times*. https://www.ft.com/content/27a29a3b-8cc9-4ab5-b8c882a386065df5 (3 pp.)

## M 11/21 GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY I: THE SPREAD OF TERRORISM (55 pp.)

*What is a terrorist? Is one person’s terrorist another’s freedom fighter? Why do certain national and global actors choose a terrorist strategy? What do most terrorists want? How do terrorist groups seek to achieve those goals? Why do terrorists form international networks and how do they function? How important is the terrorist threat--and to whom? What is the most efficient way for countries like the US and Europe to manage it?*

**Film:** *Battle of Algiers*, directed by Gilles Pontecorvo, 1966, 123 mins. [The New Criterion Collection version.]

Michael Kaufman, “What does the Pentagon See in ‘Battle of Algiers’?” *New York Times* (7 Sept 2003). (1 p.)

Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist motives and Counterterrorism

Strategy,” *International Security* 32, no. 4 (2008), pp. 93-101 ONLY (9 pp.)

Robert Pape, *Dying to Win* (2005), pp.16-24, 27-33, 38-47. (26 pp.)

Jakana Thomas. 2014. “Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Terrorism in Civil War.” *American Journal of Political Science* 58(4): 804- 816. (13 pp)

John Mueller, “Is there Still a Terrorist Threat? The Myth of an Omnipresent Enemy,"

*Foreign Affairs* (September-October 2006). (6 pp.)

***W 11/23-27* THANKSGIVING BREAK *(No lecture or precepts)***

## M 11/28 GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY II: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY (58 pp.)

*How do transnational issue networks function? What is the role of non-governmental organizations in them? What do they do? How do they seek to promote human rights? Does the evidence suggest that they are effective? Under what conditions? What is the practical difference between an international legal proceeding and a trial “in the court of global opinion”? Was Henry Kissinger morally guilty of war crimes? Was he legally guilty of war crimes?*

**Film:** *The Trials of Henry Kissinger* (2002), 80 mins. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2bFOhAAYfqk

**Readings:**

Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, “Transnational Activist Networks,” in Art and Jervis, pp. 477-483. (7 pp.)

Joshua W. Busby, *Moral Movements and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press), Chapter One (“States of Grace”), *as edited for this course,* pp. 1-9,

11-16. (15 pp.)

Gareth Evans and Mohammed Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect," *Foreign Affairs* (Nov/Dec 2002), p. 99-110. (12 pp.)

**Materials on Henry Kissinger for Precept:**

Deborah Amos, “War Crimes survivors turn to German courts when international tribunals are blocked,” *NPR Morning Edition* (4 October 2021). Available at: <https://www.npr.org/2021/10/04/1042999638/war-crimes-survivors-turn-to-german-courts-when-international-tribunals-are-bloc>

“This is Treason,” (Tape of Conversation between President Lyndon Johnson and Senator Everett Dirksen (2 November 1968), available at: https://millercenter.org/thepresidency/educational-resources/this-is-treason

Senator John McCain on Kissinger Protesters: “Get out of here, you low-life scum," https://youtu.be/OYMtEGLmD\_Y

Robert Kaplan, “In Defense of Henry Kissinger," *The Atlantic* (24 April 2013).

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/05/the-statesman/309283/ (11 pp.)

Sunil Khilnani, “In 1971, a Genocide Took Place. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger Did Nothing. Intentionally. The lost history of one of our lowest moments,” *The New Republic* (9 November 2013). Available at: <https://newrepublic.com/article/115435/gary-basss-blood-telegram-reviewed-sunil-khilnani>

Gary J. Bass, “The Terrible Cost of Presidential Racism,” *The New York Times*, September 4, 2020, op-ed, p. A27. (1 p.)

**Document:** Skim the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights

## W 11/30 21ST CENTURY POWER TRANSITIONS: THE RISE OF CHINA,

## THE DECLINE OF RUSSIA, AND WHITHER AMERICA? (pp. 83)

*How do states cope with the rise and decline of great power competitors today? How is this similar to or different from previous episodes of “power transition” we have studied? What would it mean to “win” the military competition and what would happen if it did? What policy options do the rising and declining states have--and which are more cost-effective? Does a power transition imply cooperation?*

*Competition? Conflict? Great power war? How should the US and China manage this situation consistent with their underlying power and preferences? Which evidence is most convincing in pointing to the possibilities? To what extent and for what reasons is the future inherently unclear? How should policy-makers respond to that uncertainty? How do the dangers of managing a rising China compare with those of managing a declining Russia? Which is more dangerous?*

Debate between John Ikenberry and John Mearsheimer: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2S9cOeYV-n8>

Matthew Kroenig, “International Relations Theory Suggests Great-Power War is Coming,” *Foreign Policy* (27 August 2022). (9 pp.)

Fareed Zakaria, “The New China Scare: Why America Shouldn’t Panic About Its Latest Challenger,” *Foreign Affairs* ([January/February 2020](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/issues/2020/99/1)) (12 pp.)

Thomas Christensen, *The China Challenge*,“Chapter 2: This Time Should Be Different,” (2015), pp. 37-62. (26 pp.)

Susan Shirk, “The Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Security Policies,” in *The Oxford Handbook of IR in Asia* (2014). (24 pp.)

“Glad Confident Mornings: Repairing the World’s Economic Architecture and Working with China is in America’s Interest,” *The Economist* (3 October, 2015). (2 pp.)

Graham Allison, “Thucydides’ Trap Has Been Sprung in the Pacific,” *Financial Times* (22 August 2012) (1 p.)

“Allies and Interests: Pax Trumpiana," *The Economist* (17 December, 2016). (6 pp.)

T. Hancock, “China encircles the world with One Belt, One Road strategy,” *Financial Times* (May 3, 2017). (3 pp.) Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/0714074a-0334-11e7aa5b-6bb07f5c8e12

**M 12/5 NO LECTURE**

## W 12/7 THE FUTURE OF WORLD POLITICS: THE END OF HISTORY? (56 pp.)

*What will the future of world politics look like? Taking into account the readings in the second half of the course—plus those below—what alternative scenarios can we imagine? Which ones seem most likely? In what ways will the eternal theoretical truths of world politics remain valid? In what ways might we need to alter them?*

Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” *The National Interest* (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18. (15 pp.)

G. John Ikenberry, “The Plot Against American Foreign Policy: Can the Liberal Order Survive?” *Foreign Affairs* (April 2017). At:

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-04-17/plot-againstamerican-foreign-policy (8 pp.)

Anne-Marie Slaughter & Gordon LaForge, “Opening Up the Order,” *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2021), pp. 154-162. (9 pp.)

Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini, “A G-Zero World,” *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2011). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-01-31/g-zero-world. (6 pp.)

Yuval Noah Harari, *Sapiens* (2016), “Chapter 20: The End of Homo Sapiens,” pp. 397-414. (18 pp.)

## *W 12/7* SPECIAL REVIEW SESSION FOR THE FINAL EXAM (TIME TBD)