Department of Politics **POL 551 / Fall 2024**
Princeton University **Tue 1:30-4:20**

(FIELD) SEMINAR IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

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OFFICE HOURS: Mondays 13:30-15:00 or by appointment

This seminar critically examines fundamental theories of international relations (IR). Unlike most other graduate courses in the Politics Department, this one does not focus either on empirical assessments of narrower problems or on the application of specific methodological techniques. Rather, it introduces foundational concepts, causal mechanisms, broad regularities, and conditional claims that scholars have proposed over the years as vital underlying drivers of world politics. The assigned readings span a century, starting with classics by E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz to articles that just appeared this year.

Following two introductory sessions concerned with the purposes of social scientific theory and the basic ways in which IR theories converge and diverge, the next five sessions focus on a series of distinct types ("schools," "paradigms," "approaches," "grand theories") of IR theory. The following four sessions focus on the broad implications of such approaches for recurrent social processes in international relations, such as bargaining, conflict, order and cooperation, and long-term social change. A final session offers participants an open-ended opportunity to discuss how we can creatively fill in what seems to be missing in modern IR theory. Normally, this course is team taught, but this year, we will invite as many Princeton IR faculty as possible to appear as class visitors. They will discuss the material and offer their own insights and discuss the specific (and varied) beliefs about the fundamentals of IR that have inspired their career paths.

What exactly can students hope to get out of this course? At the most basic level, this theoretical material prepares students pursuing the PhD in Political Science or Public Policy for the comprehensive departmental examinations in IR. It also lays a firm foundation for further, narrower courses during their graduate career. The course covers a lot of ground, on the assumption that many who take it have encountered some of this material before—but it is also meant to provide a self-contained introduction for those who have not.

At a somewhat deeper level, the seminar offers a chance for us to work together to develop a basic "tool kit" of concepts, causal mechanisms, and theories. Such a tool kit can enrich scholarship by framing explanations for phenomena in ways that are both more generalizable and more varied. *Generalizable* because the best social science tries to "say a lot with a little." That is, it seeks to draw from data about specific cases an original set of deeper and broader insights about what makes world politics tick in general. To hone our ability to make this linkage between the particular and the general, we need to understand what basic causal processes may exist in world politics and what scholars already know about them.

Varied because the field of IR does not (contrary to what undergraduates are often taught) rest on

a single set of indubitable truths about world politics. Rather, it is a *conversation* among diverse (though not infinitely varied or malleable) theories. As the legendary sociologist Arthur Stinchcombe once wrote, any graduate "student who has difficulty thinking of at least three sensible explanations for any correlation that they are really interested in should probably choose another profession." Rich scholarship takes account of many possible theoretical insights and explanations, any one of which might potentially be relevant in any specific case. In other words, the central challenge to social scientific understanding is hardly ever that we cannot think of any possible explanation for something but, rather, than we cannot or will not consider enough explanations. Making a deep contribution to the field of IR requires, therefore, that one knows not just what one believes but also what one is thereby arguing *against*. Stinchcombe's dictum implies that those of us who remain unaware of the full range of theoretical possibilities condemn themselves to theoretical (and methodological) superficiality. This course is designed to help us all enrich our portfolio of options, and thereby to avoid confirming a particular theory because we have overlooked the alternatives or disconfirming it because we have not specified a sympathetic or accurate account of it.

Productive engagement in such a multi-perspectival theoretical conversation requires more than a vague understanding of what theories say (or, worse, what scholars claim they say), as most undergraduate courses provide. It rests on a firm grasp of the internal structure of different types of theory and their relationship to other theories. This seminar aims to provide a engaged, collegial, creative, and curiosity-driven place to work collectively to situate specific concepts, arguments and claims in the broad intellectual structure and history of IR theory; to parse their specific (often unstated) assumptions, logical structures, causal mechanisms, empirical implications; to discuss their characteristic strengths and weaknesses, blind spots and exaggerations; to trace their likely scope of application; to appreciate the basic types of evidence (empirical examples, case studies, correlations, and process observations) typically adduced for and against them; and to understand the broader claims about world politics that are at stake when theorists claim specific things about a specific issue.

At the same time, however, creative and progressive scholarship requires specialization. For social scientists, to conclude in any given case that "everything matters" (or "everything might matter") is an admission that one knows very little about its real causes. Those engaged in productive scholarly conversations tend, therefore, to advance specific, narrower and more internally coherent theoretical accounts. Perhaps the deepest benefit of this course for many participants may well be psychological, temperamental, and philosophical. Engaging with such material invites each one of us to explore and refine our own personal beliefs about what claims about the essential nature of world politics seem most convincing—and to bounce those intuitions off others. Based on such hunches, scholars are constantly asked to formulate dissertation topics, grant applications, book proposals, and article ideas—some of which can define one's scholarly trajectory for many years. Best to make such career-defining commitments in a self-conscious and thoughtful way, fully aware of the options, and in a supportive environment, rather than selecting an approach because it seems superficially plausible, fashionable, convenient, or politically correct.

Course Requirements

The course has six requirements, graded according to the percentages below.

(1) ***Attendance, reading and active participation in discussion (30%).*** Participation is the most important element in the class and, therefore, among the largest single components of grading. We all learn from discussion. The primary purpose of this seminar is to provide a space where participants can freely and collectively discuss complex and broad-ranging theoretical issues on which people can legitimately disagree. These readings are chosen because they are important. The precondition for serious discussion of them is that each participant understands the basic assumptions, claims and theoretical implications scholars have proposed and the general disciplinary understanding of those claims. Yet the course also encourages critical thinking and challenges to those claims, and robust debate and disagreement with each other about them. Accordingly, students are expected to attend class having read all the required readings closely and having thought about them sufficiently to be able to participate actively, intelligently, flexibly, and distinctively in class discussions of every reading. Students should be prepared to summarize, evaluate and assess critically the nature and significance of each reading—at a moment's notice and without notes. More importantly, they should be able to use that knowledge to contribute to a free-ranging discussion on this material. Performance is graded, but each student receives three "get out of jail free" cards for the semester: if students inform the class and instructors before a given session starts that they have not done a particular reading, they will be excused from answering questions on that single reading (but not the whole reading assignment!).
Here is a rubric for evaluating readings. Each week, you should come to class having thought about the following questions for each paper:

What is the goal of the author?
What assumptions do they make?
What causal mechanisms do they focus on?
What conclusions do they draw?
How do they use evidence (if they do) and is it appropriate for the purpose?
How does this reading relate to the others this week?
How do this week's readings relate to those in other weeks?

(2) ***Formal summary, advocacy and defense of most selected readings (20%).*** This course is comprised exclusively of prominent scholarship: the readings contain ideas, claims and implications that have inspired decades of debate. At the same time, many contain basic ambiguities, errors, gaps, and things most scholars no longer (if ever) generally believe to be true. While the seminar assumes that each student has read all the work closely, we want to begin the open discussion of each week with a collective sense of the big overarching issues each week raises, and the strengths and weaknesses of various ways of addressing them. Accordingly, each week three students will sign up to serve in one of three roles, as: (A) a presenter of a focused synthesis of the week's reading, (B) an advocate for the readings, singly and collectively, (C) a critic of the readings, singly and collectively. Each will speak for no longer than 7 minutes at the start of class: the use of slides, handouts or other means to enhance comprehension is encouraged.

- Student A does not engage in criticism but presents the arguments. *This <u>does not</u> mean serially summarizing the arguments of the papers.* The presentation should

begin, instead, by summarizing in a few sentences what this literature tells us that is not obvious from common-sense or policy experience. That would, of course, be unnecessary, since everyone has read all of them. Rather, the student should: (a) *identify what the authors of the papers seek to explain*, including similarities and differences among them; (b) identify *what is puzzling* and interesting about those patterns; (c) identify *the similarities and differences among the theories* the authors propose to explain those puzzles; (d) identify what *prima facie* evidence would seems, in theory and on the surface, might be used to confirm or disconfirm such claims; (e) identify the *implications for world politics* past, present and future. This student neither criticizes nor evaluates the theory. The student should conclude, however, with study questions for the class.

- Student B should make the case that the authors have, singly and collectively, done a convincing and fruitful job of engaging these issues—highlighting central, important, and general takeaways.

- Student C should make the case that the authors have, singly and collectively, done a flawed or unconvincing job of engaging these issues—*and* propose what should or might be done instead.

(3) ***Two 5 pp. papers commenting on required readings (5% each = 10%).*** Most academic debate or research is conducted in writing, which allows scholars to advance lines of argument more thoughtfully and rigorously. Students sign up to write papers in response to three different weeks. Each paper comments critically on *at least two* of the required readings for that week. The papers must be e-mailed/posted to the entire class by *3 p.m. on the Monday immediately preceding class*. These papers may, if absolutely necessary, engage in a *minimal* amount of unavoidable summary of the respective readings, and occasionally briefly "referee" debates among established authorities, but *neither is their primary purpose*. Instead, most of the paper should be devoted to engaging in *constructive* criticism and, even more importantly, setting forth original theoretical, empirical or methodological insights about how IR scholars might improve these theories and/or develop new insights about important cases, thereby charting the best direction forward toward new and improved IR theory. The amount of summary and criticism should never exceed the original theoretical contribution. Papers will be graded accordingly.

(4) ***One 3 pp. paper commenting constructively on a presentation in the IR Faculty Colloquium (10%).*** The IR Faculty Colloquium meets every week from 12:15-1:15 on Mondays in semester. Top professors and post-doctoral students in the field present research. Attendance at the sessions is strongly advised (plus you get a free lunch). Each student is required to sign up for a session and write a critical paper on that session. The paper will be judged by how serious an effort it makes to rigorously provide constructive criticism that extends the discussion in these sessions. The paper should be sent to the class and will be forwarded to the speaker.

(5) ***One 2 pp. paper proposing a new sub-topic for the course and 2-5 corresponding readings (10%).*** A one-semester course on IR theory can be designed in many ways and, thus, any design necessarily must neglect some topics. One of the basic creative skills of

a scholar is to spot new issues, lines of theory, and substantive topics—and this is a matter on which younger scholars often have original and heterodox views. Accordingly, this assignment proposes a week of new readings. Students are free to choose any topic and propose six readings. The paper should include at least one page of single-spaced analysis answering the five questions (a through e) above and a half page explaining why these five readings were selected. Here is a chance to be creative and forward-looking. We will choose a set of these readings to discuss in the final session.

(6) ***One take-home final exam (20%).*** The questions on the exam will be similar to those found on the departmental "General Exams" in IR. Each student will be asked to answer three broad questions about the IR literature discussed in this syllabus.

Logistics

All written work for the course should be submitted in electronic form *by email attachment only* with *your name and the assignment on the files.* Any and all e-mail pertaining to the course should have a subject line beginning "POL551: …"

Books are on reserve on-line and permanent links to articles are provided. Those who desire personal copies of books should search for copies from on-line providers; we recommend you purchase them used. Additional recommended readings, for use in studying for general exams if you are serious about research in IR, have been included as well.

An Important Note

Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954) is a pre-read for this course. We will address it primarily in Week 2 in a way that requires close reading. It is a long read, so get started before the semester starts!

SEMINAR SCHEDULE AND READINGS

Week 1: Why Do We Study International Relations? What Type of Profession is this? What is a Good Theory?

Week 2: On What Do IR Theories Agree and Disagree?

Week 3: The Distribution of Coercive Capabilities (aka "Realism")

Week 4: Variation in the Means-Ends Reasoning of Elites and Masses (aka "Non-Rational Theories" of Psychology, Cognition, Perception, Socialization, Emotion, Habit, Bureaucratic/Institutional Processes)

Week 5: Interdependence among Social Preferences I: Social Ideas and Interests (aka "Ideational and Commercial Liberalism")

Week 6: Interdependence among Social Preferences II: Domestic Institutions and the Aggregation and Weighting of Preferences (aka "Republican Liberalism")

Week 7: The Distribution of Information: Informal International Norms (aka Asymmetric Information, Global Civil Society, Signaling, Communication, International Regimes)

Week 8: Theorizing Interstate Bargaining Outcomes – Who Gets What?

Week 9: Explaining Interstate Conflict and War

Week 10: Explaining Global Order and Stability – Who Runs the Show?

Week 11: Issue-Specific International Policy Coordination in Security Affairs

Week 12: Issue-Specific International Policy Coordination in Non-Security Affairs

Week 13: What is Missing?

SEMINAR SCHEDULE AND READINGS

Week 1 (September 3): Why Study International Relations? What Type of Profession is this? What is a Good Theory?

Epstein, David. (2019) The Peculiar Blindness of Experts: Credentialed Authorities are Comically Bad at Predicting the Future. But Reliable Forecasting is Possible. *The Atlantic* (June).

Michael Desch, Ido Oren, Laura Sjoberg, Helen Louise Turton, Erik Voeten, and Stephen M. Walt. (2015) Symposium: Technique Trumps Relevance: The Professionalization of Political Science and the Marginalization of Security Studies. *Perspectives on Politics* 13:2 (June), pp. 573-604.

Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman. (2003) Lessons from Lakatos. In Elman and Elman, eds., *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), pp. 19-20, 21-68.

Elster, Jon (1998). A Plea for Mechanisms. In Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg (Eds.), *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory* (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press), pp. 45-73.

Jeffrey A. Friedan and David Lake. (2005) International Relations as a Social Science: Rigor and Relevance. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. 600, pp.136-156. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25046115.pdf

Daniel Maliniak, Ryan Powers, and Barbara F. Walter. (2013) The Gender Citation Gap in International Relations. *International Organization*. 67 (4): 889-922. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818313000209

Koliopoulos, Constantinos. (2010/2019). International Relations and the Study of History. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.242

Week 2 (September 10): On What Do IR Theories Agree and Disagree?

Waltz, Kenneth. (1954) *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press), complete (pre-read, see above).

Waltz, Kenneth. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, Chapters 2-4.

Milner, Helen V. (1991). The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: a Critique. *Review of International Studies*, 17(1): 67-85. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097244

David Lake and Robert Powell. (1999) The Strategic Choice Approach. In David Lake and Robert Powell, eds. *Strategic Choice and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapter 1 (pp. 3-38).

Colgan, Jeff D. (2016). "Where is international relations going? Evidence from graduate training." *International Studies Quarterly* 60(3): 486-498. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44510090

Daniel Maliniak, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers, and Michael J. Tierney (2018) Is International Relations a Global Discipline? Hegemony, Insularity, and Diversity in the Field. *Security Studies.* 27(3): 448-484. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1416824

Kristensen, Peter Marcus. (2018) International Relations at the End: A Sociological Autopsy. *International Studies Quarterly,* 62(2): 245-259. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48618499

Helen V Milner, Ryan Powers, and Erik Voeten. (2023) The Myth of the Eclectic IR Scholar? *International Studies Perspectives* 24(3): 308–335. https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ekac012

Week 3 (September 17): Variation in Coercive Capabilities (aka "Realism")

Morgenthau, Hans Joachim. (1950 or later). *Politics among Nations.* New York: Knopf. 2nd or later edition. Chapter 1 ("A Realist Theory of International Politics"), Chapter 3 ("Political Power"), and Chapter 15 ("Morality, Mores, and Law as Restraints on Power").

Waltz, Kenneth. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley), Chapters 5-6, 8.

Mearsheimer, John J. (2001) *Tragedy of Great Power Politics.* New York, NY: W.W. Norton. Chapters 1, 2.

Jervis, Robert. (1978). Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. *World Politics* 30(2): 167-221. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2009958

Schmidt, Brian C. (2012) On The History and Historiography of International Relations. In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth A. Simmons eds., *Handbook of International Relations*, 2nd edition (Sage), pp. 3-28. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446247587

Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik. (1999) "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" *International Security,* 24(2) :5-55 (Available at https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/anybody.pdf)

Nye, Joseph S. (2009) Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power. *Foreign Affairs*, 88(4): 160-163. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20699631

Week 4 (24 September): Variation in the "Rationality" of Individuals, Elites, Masses, and States (*aka* "Non-Rational Theories" of Cognition, Perception, Psychology, Emotion, Habit, Bureaucratic Process, Institutional Bias, Aggregation, Socialization, Groupthink, Strategic Culture, Social Construction, etc.)

Carr, E.H. Utopia and Reality. In *The Twenty Years' Crisis. 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1940/46), Chapter 2, pp. 16-30.

Jervis, Robert. (1968) Hypotheses on Misperception. *World Politics* 20(3), 454-79. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400886326-009

Wendt, Alexander E. (1992). Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organization*. 46(2): 391-425. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858

Wendt, Alexander E. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 3, 6, 7.

James D. Fearon and Alexander E. Wendt (2002). Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View. In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen and Beth A. Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (pp. 52-72). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Joshua Kertzer and Dustin Tingley. (2018) Political Psychology in International Relations: Beyond the Paradigms. *Annual Review of Political Science* 21: 319-339. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041916-020042

Allison, Graham T. (1969) Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis. *American Political Science Review*. 63(3): 689-718. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1954423

Lock, Edward. (2017) Strategic culture theory: What, why, and how. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.320

Saunders, Elizabeth N. (2009). Transformative Choices: Leaders and the Origins of Intervention Strategy. *International Security*. 34(2): 119-161. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2009.34.2.119

Week 5 (1 October): Interdependence among State Purposes I - Social Preferences (aka "Ideational and Commercial Liberalism")

Moravcsik, Andrew (1997). Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. *International Organization*. 51(4): 513-553. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2703498

Lars-Erik Cederman, T. Camber Warren, and Didier Sornette (2011). Testing Clausewitz: Nationalism, Mass Mobilization, and the Severity of War. *International Organization*. 65(4): 605-638. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23016228

Owen, John M. (2010) *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States and Regime Change, 1510-2010.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapter 1 (pp. 1-30). https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400836765

Lake, David. (2009) Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review. *Review of International Organization* 4(3): 219-244. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11558-009-9060-y

Rogowski, Ronald (1987) Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. *American Political Science Review* 81(4) (December), pp. 1121-1137. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1962581

Frieden, Jeffry A. (1991) Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance. *International Organization*. 45(4): 425-451. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706944

Ed Mansfield and Diane Mutz (2009) Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety. *International Organization*, 63, Summer pp: 425-457, doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090158

Ruggie, J.G. (1982) International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-War Economic Order. *International Organization* (Spring), pp. 385-398. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706527

Week 6 (October 8): Interdependence among Social Purposes II - Domestic Institutions and State Preferences (aka "Republican Liberalism")

Keren Yarhi-Milo, Mike Tomz, and Jessica Weeks. (2020). "Public Opinion and Decisions about Military Force in Democracies," *International Organization*, 74(1): 119-143. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706527

Rogowski, Ronald (1999). Institutions as Constraints on Strategic Choice. In David A. Lake and Robert Powell (Eds.), *Strategic Choice and International Relations* Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 115-136.

Milner, Helen V. (1997). *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1, 3-4.

Susan D. Hyde and Elizabeth N. Saunders (2020). "Recapturing Regime Type in International Relations: Leaders, Institutions, and Agency Space." *International Organization* 74(2): 363-395.

Hayes, Jarrod. (2012). "The democratic peace and the new evolution of an old idea." *European Journal of International Relations* 18(4): 767-791. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066111405859

Snyder, Jack L. (1991). *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Chapters 1, 2, and 8. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt32b48h

Goemans, Hein K. and Mark Fey. (2009) Risky but Rational: War as an Institutionally Induced Gamble. *Journal of Politics* 71: 35-54. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1017/s0022381608090038

Week 7 (October 22): The Distribution of Information (aka Asymmetric Information, Communication, Signaling and Credibility, Global Civil Society, Experimentalism, International Regimes)

Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. *Activists Beyond Borders.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998, Introduction plus one of the two empirical chapters, pp. 79-120 or 121-164. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt5hh13f

Busby, Joshua. *Moral Movements and Foreign Policy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, "Chapter 1, States of Grace" and "Chapter 7: Conclusions" (pp. 1-22, 255-272). https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511779893

Trager, Robert F. (2010). Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How Communication Matters. *American Political Science Review*. 104(2): 347-368. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40863724

Oye, Kenneth A. (1985) Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies. *World Politics* 38(1): 1-24. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2010349

Keohane, Robert O. (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1, 4-6. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400820269

Martin, Lisa L. (1992). Interests, Power, and Multilateralism. *International Organization*. 46(4): 765-792. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706874

Grieco, Joseph M. (1988). Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. *International Organization*. 42(3): 485-507. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706787

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization.* 52(4): 889-917. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2601361

Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot. (2011) International practices. *International Theory* 3(1): 1-36.

Slaughter, Anne-Marie. "Networks Everywhere," in *The Chessboard and the Web* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), pp. 42-65.

Week 8 (October 29): Theorizing Interstate Bargaining Outcomes – Who Gets What?

Baldwin, David A. (2012). Power and International Relations. In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (Eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (2nd ed., pp. 273-298). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Michael N Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005). Power in International Politics. *International Organization*. 59(1): 39-75. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877878

Schelling, Thomas C. (1960). *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chapters 1-3, and 8.

Robert O Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. (1977). *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company: 3-19.

Morrow, James. "The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling Commitment and Negotiation in International Politics" in David A. Lake and Robert Powell eds., *Strategic Choice and International Relations* (Princeton 1999) pp. 77-114.

Putnam, Robert D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. *International Organization*. 42(3): 427-460. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706785

Fearon, James D. (1994). Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. *American Political Science Review*. 88(3): 577-592. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944796

Jack Snyder and Erica D. Borghard (2011). The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound. *American Political Science Review*. 105(3): 437-456. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41480851

Joshua D. Kertzer and Ryan Brutger (2016). "Decomposing Audience Costs: Bringing the Audience Back into Audience Cost Theory." *American Journal of Political Science* 60(1): 234-249. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24583061

Ramsay, Kristopher W. (2011). Cheap Talk Diplomacy, Voluntary Negotiations, and Variable Bargaining Power. *International Studies Quarterly*. 55(4): 1003-1023. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41409809

Week 9 (November 5): Violent International Conflict and War

Gat, Azar. (2013). "Is war declining–and why?" *Journal of Peace Research* 50(2): 149-157. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23441182

Fearon, James D. (1995). Rationalist Explanations for War. *International Organization.* 49(3): 379-414. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706903

Powell, Robert. (2006) "War as a Commitment Problem." *International Organization.* 60(1): 169-203. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3877871

Lake, David A. (2010) Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War. *International Security* 35(3): 7-52. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40981251

Mark Fey and Kristopher W. Ramsay. (2007) Mutual Optimism and War. *American Journal of Political Science*. 51(4): 738-754. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4620097

Tarar, Ahmer. (2022). Risk preferences, uncertainty, and war. *International Interactions.* 48(2): 233-257. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2021.1983566

Goemans, Hein (2010). War termination. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.41

Sechser, Todd, S. (2010) Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power. *International Organization*. 64(4): 627-660. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40930451.pdf

Owen, John M. 2010. *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States and Regime Change, 1510-2010.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010, Chapters 1-3. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400836765

Bass, Gary. *Freedom's Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention.* New York: Knopf, 2008, pp. 3-38.

Valerie M. Hudson, Mary Caprioli, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Rose McDermott, and Chad F. Emmett. (2008/09) The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States. *International Security*. 33(3): 7-45.

Sullivan, Patricia L. (2007). War Aims and War Outcomes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 51(3): 496-524. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002707300187

Jonathan M. DiCicco and Jack S. Levy (1999). Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 43(6): 675-704. http://www.jstor.org/stable/174600

Legro, Jeffrey W. (1997). Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism. *International Organization*. 51(1): 31-63. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2703951

Week 10 (November 12): Global Order and Stability – Who Runs the Big Show?

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Week 11 (19 November): Issue-Specific International Policy Coordination in Security Affairs

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Week 12 (3 December): Theorizing Issue-Specific Int'l Policy Coordination in Non-Security Affairs

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Carnegie, Allison. (2014). States Held Hostage: Political Hold-Up Problems and the Effects of International Institutions. *American Political Science Review* 108: 54-70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000646

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Review Week 7 Readings on information.

Open-ended Discussion: What's Missing?

These readings are just suggestive.

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