

## TOPICS IN IR: EXTREME RIGHT POPULISM AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Andrew Moravcsik

**Prerequisites:** None.

**Class Meeting Time:** Wed 1:30-4:20, except for meeting on Nov 22, not .

**Meeting Location:** Robertson 35

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**Office:** Robertson 443

**Office Hours:** Mondays 13:30-15:00 or by appointment

**Class Meetings:**

This course addresses one of the major political concerns of our times: the rise of extreme-right populist parties (ERPs). Over the last several decades, support for such parties and movements has grown, and politicians such as Donald Trump, Viktor Orbán, Giorgia Meloni, Narendra Modi, and Benjamin Netanyahu have risen to govern many established democracies. We don't know what the future will bring, but few deny that the consequences of populist movements could potentially be large for some time to come. Over the past generation, more scholarship, political analysis, and journalism has been devoted to extreme-right parties than all other party families combined.

This course explores the following questions: What is extreme-right populism? Why do people in (hybrid or full) democracies support it? What might its ideology and rhetoric imply, and what consistent real-world impact does it have, on foreign policy? To what extent does it stoke international conflict or undermine cooperation to manage armed conflict, mutually beneficial policy coordination, or the provision of global public goods? And how should we talk about these issues, that is, what type of rhetoric, framing, political strategies or feasible changes in political institutions and practices might shift prevailing narratives and political behavior about the extreme-right? While this course covers considerable time to all these questions, it focuses primarily on an issue that has received less attention: how to explain the differential impact ERPs have had on the concrete foreign policies of influential democratic countries around the world.

Though almost all such parties employ distinctive foreign policy rhetoric, their effect on concrete policy seems to vary very widely across countries and issues. For example, most people believe President Trump's term in office had—and a hypothetical second term would have even more—considerable impact on US foreign policy and global politics, yet this is disputed. In a country like Italy extreme-right populists currently govern, while in Austria they have been in the government for almost half the last quarter century, with relatively little visible impact on foreign policy. Other countries seem to be in between. To answer these questions, we will draw on scholarly research, policy analyses, case studies, journalistic accounts, student contributions, and meetings with a selection of prominent politicians, decision-makers, policy experts, consultants or scholars.

These issues often involve conflicts among fundamental identities and values, or even concerns of life and death for some vulnerable populations. While these issues are essential for policymakers and citizens to understand, they are often ambiguous, polarizing, and disconcerting. As President Christopher Eisgruber and Dean Amaney Jamal have stressed publicly, a core pedagogical mission of modern universities is to create an open discursive community in which members can address such issues in a spirit of “civil disagreement.” In other words, universities (at their best) should allow each of us to discuss, debate, share, criticize, and learn from competing perspectives, and have a chance to scrutinize and adjust our own views, free from the immediate and often overriding material or cultural incentives that often push “real world” professional and social life toward conformism. If we were to leave this class without attempting to do achieve this ideal—but instead simply adhere uncritically to previous beliefs or conventional wisdom—what purpose would it serve?

Carrying out this mission implies that all of us in the class collectively commit to fostering an honest, open-ended, and fact-based search for deeper insight and understanding. Remaining open to diverse information, interpretations, theories, judgements, and ethical positions means, in turn, means critically engaging the statements and views expressed by authors of the readings, by those around us in society, by pundits and politicians, and by other students in the class. Everyone must also feel free to challenge any of these views—even when we are unsure what we think or feel that arguments and positions being considered or advocated offend our own fundamental values or those of others. Maintaining an environment in which we can consider views some consider disagreeable or offensive in a respectful and productive manner is our common responsibility.

Princeton University’s formal rules/norms governing this delicate process are two. First, *PU policy prohibits “behavior that constitutes discrimination or harassment,” yet explicitly states that “disagreeable or offensive ideas or opinions that are not directed at a specific individual are allowable under the principle of freedom of expression.”* I interpret this to mean that everyone should feel free to advance positions, opinions, ideas and facts in class, even in sensitive areas that may seem “disagreeable or offensive” to others, as long as there is some reason to believe that it helps someone in the room understand the issues we are discussing. Similarly, everyone should feel free to disagree directly with positions, opinions, ideas and facts advanced by others inside or outside the class, without fear of any formal or social censure. However, *ad hominem* argument, incitement to immediate and illegal violence against specific individuals, uncontrolled anger and frustration, outright rudeness, or disruption without any such pedagogical purpose are out of bounds. Beyond this, we can all hope that everyone will make an extra informal effort to be sensitive to the beliefs and feelings of others, while maintaining space for civil disagreement in the search for deeper understanding.

Second, Princeton University is committed to “providing support and resources to affected individuals” who feel that any material being discussed (or the way it is discussed) is upsetting, even where it does not transgress the norms above about legitimate and productive disagreement. Accordingly, if at any point anyone feels that a topic, reading, statement, or discussion in this class transgresses these norms, they should feel free to discuss the matter with the instructor, propose it as a topic of conversation in class, seek individual accommodation, and/or avail themselves of

broader Princeton University resources. Possible solutions at the level of the course may include, insofar as feasible, a shift in the terms of discussion. Student may also ask not to attend a specific session or not to conduct an assignment when they feel the topic is particularly difficult. This must be done with proper advance notice to and approval of the instructor, and students will receive a replacement assignment. I commit to being available to discuss with any student or group of students any broader issues about how the course is progressing, including suggestions as to how all students might better realize our collective goal of learning through civil disagreement.

### Logistics

All submissions for this class should be sent to the instructor and other students, as appropriate, in the form of e-mail attachments. Every submission should be in a separate file, formatted in MSWord (not PDF) and *the file title should include your own name and the name of assignment*.

All readings will be made available to students electronically.

The class will also establish a chat room.

### Grading

The level and distribution of grades will conform to SIPA rules, guidelines, norms and practices. To receive a passing letter grade, a student must complete all four parts of this class.

- **45% Final Research Paper.** Students are expected to write 20–25-page research paper (12 point type, double-spaced, with footnotes single spaced) analyzing the domestic and international causes and consequences of far-right populist political pressure on one or a small number of important concrete foreign-policy issues in a particular country or small number of countries. More specific guidelines will be presented in class. Students present their (unfinished) research during the last several weeks of the course: this presentation is mandatory but will not be otherwise graded. The paper is due 13 December. By 21 October, students must submit by e-mail a short memo (min 500 words) setting forth the topic of their final paper, their research design and data collection strategies, the challenges they expect to face, and the questions they have about it. The instructor must discuss and approve the proposal.
- **10% Policy Memo.** This policy memo, 700 words or less. should give substantive and political advice to a specific politician about how best to select among various options to advance or combat far-right populist influence in a specific issue area and country. This memo cannot be on the same topic as either of the writers' final papers. This memo will be graded on form, writing, style, clarity, as well as content. This memo is due Monday, 31 March, at midnight. We will circulate them all to the entire class once the deadline passes.

- **10% Opinion Piece.** This “op-ed” or “opinion” piece, 700 words or less, is designed to appeal to undecided voters to vote for or against an extreme-right party in a particular newspaper in a particular country. It is to be accompanied by a two-paragraph explanation of what voters are being targeted, what evidence and/or analysis suggests that this is a particularly efficient way to target them, and how the op-ed was specifically crafted considering this information.
- **35% Class, Attendance, Participation, and Activities:** Students are expected to complete all the assigned readings; to participate actively, creatively, and respectfully in class discussions; and engage in all class activities. For example, there will be some “mini-assignments” and/or “mini-presentations” coordinated with class discussion. In addition, by the third meeting of the class. In addition, in consultation with the instructor, each student will select one issue and one country on which they will serve as our “in-class expert” for the semester. In addition to responding to questions and carrying out assignments, students must make at least one remark in each seminar meeting. Students may also be asked to help prepare interactions with invited speakers.

### **Attendance and Excuses**

Attendance and participation are computed into the final grade, as detailed above. Any unexcused absence results in a lower grade and three unexcused absences results in “non-completion” of the attendance requirement and, therefore, failure of the entire course.

Formal SPIA policies and guidelines on attendance state that “students are expected to attend all classes unless they have an excused absence: a severe medical issue, family emergency/death, or significant career-related activity.” Any of these three types of excuse should be routinely documented by a note from a relevant professional stating that the condition unavoidably precludes attending class (e.g. a medical note must come from a medical professional stating not just that a student suffers from a medical condition but that the condition renders class participation or completing an assignment impossible for a specific period). During the semester, students are allowed one excused career-related absence, which must be fully documented as unavoidable and communicated to the instructor as soon as the student knows about it and, in any case, within 48 hours of class. If it means that some in class assignment will be disturbed, it is the student’s responsibility to find someone else to do it. Make-up work may be assigned.

### **Deadlines**

In addition to the general administrative deadlines imposed by SPIA and Princeton, and the deadlines for classroom readings and assignments, students should remain aware of the following longer-term deadlines.

- o Monday, 29 January, midnight: Submit partner and suggested issue and country of

expertise. (Each team should be responsible for both an issue and a country, not one issue in one country.)

- o Monday, 26 February, midnight: Submit 500-word research paper proposal.
- o Monday, March 18, midnight: Propose topics for policy memo to instructors.
- o Sunday, 8 April, midnight: Submit jointly written policy memos to instructors.
- o Monday before the class where you present in Weeks 12, 13, 14: One page summary of presentation
- o Monday, 29 April, midnight: Submit final paper.

In addition, student presentations are due

Brief written assignments for class, if any, are due the day before class meets.

### **Unexcused Late Work**

Late work is subject to the same documentation and substantive rules as attendance in class (see above). Students submitting late assignments will receive an automatic letter-grade reduction for the assignment. For instance, an A- becomes a B-, and so on. After three days, this will double. These deductions do not apply in situations where students have medical issues or other accommodation recognized by Columbia and/or SIPA.

We recognize, however, that obligations occasionally arise through the semester that prevent students from submitting assignments on time. Accordingly, all students have the opportunity for one “no-questions-asked” 24-hour extension on one single assignment during the semester. To invoke this extension, students must email the instructor to request the extension at least 24 hours prior to the original deadline.

**Pass/Fail:** As per SIPA rules, students may take this seminar Pass/Fail. To receive a “Pass,” a student must do the reading, attend class, participate in an active and informed way in class, and complete the assigned work, and engage in speaker preparation, as do other students. To receive a “Pass,” a student must pass each of the four parts of the class listed above, and that the cumulative grade averaged and weighted across the four areas above must be a C or higher.

**Auditing (R Credit):** Students may audit the course for R credit, subject to individual approval by the instructor. Given that this is a participation- and reading-intensive seminar, however, it makes little sense for students to audit the class without fulfilling the same requirements as a regular student taking the course Pass/Fail. If students nonetheless wish to discuss this option, they should contact the instructor during the first week of the course to schedule a meeting to discuss it.

**SIPA Academic Integrity Statement:** The School of International & Public Affairs does not tolerate cheating or plagiarism in any form. Students who violate the Code of Academic & Professional Conduct will be subject to the Dean’s Disciplinary Procedures. Please familiarize yourself with the proper methods of citation and attribution. SIPA and Columbia provide valuable

resources online; we strongly encourage you to familiarize yourself with these various styles before conducting research. Cut and paste the following link into your browser to view the Code of Academic & Professional Conduct and to access useful resources on citation and attribution: <http://bulletin.columbia.edu/sipa/academic-policies/>. Violations of the Code of Academic & Professional Conduct should be reported to the Associate Dean for Student Affairs.

**SIPA Disability Statement:** SIPA is committed to ensuring that students registered with [Columbia University's Disability Services](#) (DS) receive the reasonable accommodations necessary to participate fully in their academic programs. If you are a student with a disability and have a DS-certified accommodation letter, you may wish to make an appointment with your course instructor to discuss your accommodation. Faculty provide disability accommodations to students with DS-certified accommodation letters, and they provide the accommodations specified in such letters. If you have any additional questions, please contact SIPA's DS liaison at [disability@sipa.columbia.edu](mailto:disability@sipa.columbia.edu) or 212-854-8690.

### **WEEKLY TOPICS**

**Week 1 (4 September) – INTRODUCTION AND OPENING DISCUSSION**

**Week 2 (11 September) – U.S. FOREIGN POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP**

**Week 3 (18 September) – WHAT IS EXTREME-RIGHT POPULISM AND HOW WIDESPREAD IS IT?**

**Week 4 (25 September) – SUPPORT FOR EXTREME-RIGHT POPULISM: THE DEMAND SIDE**

**Week 5 (2 October) – SUPPORT FOR EXTREME-RIGHT POPULISM: THE SUPPLY SIDE**

**Week 6 (9 October) – EXTREME-RIGHT POPULISTS IN OFFICE**

**Week 7 (23 October) – CASE STUDIES OF COUNTRIES AND ISSUES**

**Week 8 (30 October) – CASE STUDIES OF COUNTRIES AND ISSUES**

**Week 9 (6 November) – CASE STUDIES OF COUNTRIES AND ISSUES**

**Week 10 (13 November) – HOW TO PROMOTE OR OPPOSE EXTREME-RIGHT POPULISM**

**Week 11 (20 November) – PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF STUDENT PAPERS**

**Week 12 (4 December) – PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF STUDENT PAPERS**

## READING

### **Week 1 (4 September) – INTRODUCTION AND OPENING DISCUSSION (~20 pp.)**

***How worried should we be about the rise of extreme-right populism? Why or why not? What challenges does this rise pose to substantive foreign policymaking as it has traditionally been conducted? In what countries, about what issues, and in what situations does it particularly pose such a threat? What expectations do you have of this course focused on this issue? What did you personally want to take this course and what are you hoping to get out of it? What suggestions do you have to refine the syllabus?***

Laura Silver, "Populists in Europe -- especially those on the Right -- have increased their vote share in recent elections," *Pew Research Center* (2022) <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/10/06/populists-in-europe-especially-those-on-the-right-have-increased-their-vote-shares-in-recent-elections/> (10 pp.)

Kat Devlin and Mara Mordecai, "Supporters of European populist parties stand out on key issues from EU to Putin," *Pew Research Center* (2019). <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2019/11/18/supporters-of-european-populist-parties-stand-out-on-key-issues-from-eu-to-putin/> (10 pp.)

T. Boros, et al. (2020). "The State of Populism in Europe 2020," *The State of Populism in Europe*. Brussels, Foundation for European Progressive Studies Policy Solutions. [https://euagenda.eu/upload/publications/state\\_of\\_populism\\_in\\_europe\\_2020\\_final.pdf.pdf](https://euagenda.eu/upload/publications/state_of_populism_in_europe_2020_final.pdf.pdf)

### **Week 2 (11 September) – U.S. FOREIGN POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP (118 pp. plus videos and background for assignment)**

***What goals did President Trump set for US foreign policy in his first term and how do we know? How consistent were they with his previous thinking and statements? In office, to what extent did President Trump's goals influence official US foreign policy rhetoric? Concrete and consequential US foreign policy choices? Substantive outcomes in world affairs? What types of evidence offer the most convincing answers to this question? What explains the pattern of President Trump's successes and failures? What goals has he set for a (hypothetical) second term? How would you assess the extent to which policy is likely to change, if he is elected again?***

Donald Trump. (2016) "Speech in Pittsburgh, PA" (video/with transcript, 13 August). <https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-speech-pittsburgh-pa-april-13-2016>

Donald Trump. (2024) "Speech at the Republican National Convention" (Video, 19 July). [https://youtu.be/vWlbU4c1\\_LY](https://youtu.be/vWlbU4c1_LY)

Charlie Laderman and Brendan Simms. (2017) *Donald Trump: The Making of a World View* (Lume Books), Chapter 4, pp. 95-121. (26 pp.)

Stephen Walt. (2021) "Trump's Final Foreign-Policy Report Card," *Foreign Policy* (5 January). (8 pp.)

Stephen Chaudoin, et al. (2023) "'America First' Meets Liberal Internationalism," in Robert Jervis, et al., *Chaos Reconsidered: The Liberal Order and the Future of International Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 369-382. (14 pp.)

John Mearsheimer. (2023) "Trump, Obama, and the American Foreign Policy 'Blob'," *John Anderson* (4 January). On YouTube at <https://youtu.be/WciKH7o1mbw>

Susan Glasser and Peter Baker. (2022) *The Divider: Trump in the White House, 2017-2021* (New York, Penguin Books), Chapter 6 ("My Generals"), Chapter 12 ("Shut It Down"), part of Chapter 29 ("Can Anyone Land this Plane?"), pp. 104-126, 229-246, 565-574. (50 pp.)

Donald Trump and Eric Cortellessa. (2024) "Interview: How Far Would Trump Go." *Time Magazine* (30 April). (20 pp.) <https://time.com/6972021/donald-trump-2024-election-interview/>

**As background for student assignments on individual foreign policy issues of a hypothetical second Trump Administration:** Paul Dans and Steven Groves (2024). *Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise*. (Washington, Heritage Foundation), Section 2 (Chapters 4-9) and Chapters 23 and 26, as needed. [https://static.project2025.org/2025\\_MandateForLeadership\\_FULL.pdf](https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_FULL.pdf)

### **Week 3 (19 September) – WHAT IS EXTREME-RIGHT POPULISM AND HOW INFLUENTIAL IS IT TODAY? (126 pp.)**

***How do we know "extreme-right populism" when we see it? What is "populist"? What is "right"? What is "extreme"? Is this even the right term for the phenomenon? What basic beliefs, practices and goals define extreme-right populism? What is the difference between a "thick" and "thin" ideology? How does extreme-right populism differ from left-wing populism? How widespread is support for extreme-right populist positions in democracies today? In the cast of President Trump's first and (hypothetical) second administration, which goals follow from a distinct and coherent "extreme right" or "populist" ideology, to what extent are they things most Republicans or most US politicians support, and to what extent are they President Trump's personal views? How do we know?***

Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. (2017) *Populism: A Very Short Introduction* Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapters 1-3. (pp. 1-61) (61 pp.)

David Art (2020) "The Myth of Global Populism," *Perspectives on Politics*: 1-13. (13 pp.)



Heilbrunn, J. (2024). *America Last: The Right's Century-Long Romance with Foreign Dictators*. (NY, Liverlight/Norton), Chapter 9 "Back to the Future" and "Conclusion," pp. 183-226. (42 pp.)

Jan-Werner Müller. (2015) "Parsing Populism: Who is and who is not a Populist these Days?" *Juncture* 22:2, pp. 80-89. (10 pp.)

**As background for student assignments on individual foreign policy issues of a hypothetical second Trump Administration, review readings from Week 2.**

**Week 4 (25 September) – EXPLAINING SUPPORT EXTREME-RIGHT POPULISM: THE DEMAND SIDE (85 pp.)**

***Populist and extreme right political parties have always been with us, so why do they appear stronger today? Are they really stronger than before? What are "demand-side" and "supply-side" explanations for ERP support? What do we know about the factors driving individual support for ERP parties and movements? Starting with explanations that stress either economic discontent and/or cultural values, what are the specific interpretations and what evidence confirms or disconfirms them? What else might you want to know? If demand-side factors do matter, then is the rise of right-wing populism a threat to democracy, a vindication of democracy, both, or neither?***

Sheri Berman (2021). "The Causes of Populism in the West," *Annual Review of Political Science* 24: pp. 71-88. (18 pp.)

John Judis, "It's the Economies, Stupid," *Washington Post Magazine*, November 2018. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/magazine/wp/2018/11/29/feature/the-key-tounderstanding-americas-red-blue-split-isnt-ideology-or-culture-its-economics/> (8 pp.)

Rodrik, Dani. "Populism and the Economics of Globalization," *Journal of International Business Policy* (2018) 1(1-2), pp. 12–33. (22 pp.)

Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, "Trump and populist authoritarian parties," *Perspectives on Politics* 15 (2) 2017: 443–454. (12 pp.)

Diana C. Mutz, "Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 115, 19 (2018), pp. E4330-4439. (10 pp.)

Michael Kimmelman, "France's Yellow Vests Reveal a Crisis of Mobility," *NY Times* (20 Dec 2018). <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20/world/europe/france-yellow-vests-social-mobility.html>

Eduard Louis, "Why My Father Votes for Marine Le Pen," *New York Times* (May 4, 2017). <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/04/opinion/sunday/why-my-father-votes-for-marine-le-pen.html>

James Dennison and Andrew Geddes, "A Rising Tide? The Salience of Immigration and the Rise of Anti-Immigration Political Parties in Western Europe," *The Political Quarterly* 90:1 (January-March 2019), pp. 107-116.

### **Other Background Readings:**

David Brady, John Ferejohn and A. Paparo. "Are we losing touch?" Mainstream Parties failure to represent their votes on immigration and its electoral consequences," *Italian Political Science Review* 50:3 (2020), pp. 398-421. (23 pp.)

K. Arzheimer, 'Explaining electoral support for the radical right', in J. Rydgren, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 143–165.

P. Ignazi, 'The silent counter-revolution', *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 22, no. 1, 1992, pp. 3–34.

For a rigorous and fully explained version of the economic argument, see in one of these places: Thomas Piketty, "Brahmin Left vs Merchant Right: Rising Inequality and the Changing Structure of Political Conflict" (Presentation, EHESS, Paris School of Economics, and Sciences Po, 24 January 2019). <http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Piketty2019MaxPo.pdf>

-OR- Amory Gethin, Clara Martínez-Toledano, Thomas Piketty, "Brahmin Left Versus Merchant Right: Changing Political Cleavages in 21 Western Democracies, 1948–2020," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* (Volume 137, Issue 1), February 2022, pp. 1–48. <https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjab036>

### **Week 5 (2 October) – EXPLAINING SUPPORT FOR EXTREME-RIGHT POPULISM: THE SUPPLY SIDE (108 pp.)**

***What is a supply-side explanation? What role do partisan and institutional factors play in them? What are the specific interpretations and what evidence supports or fails to support them?***

Larry M. Bartels, *Democracy Erodes from the Top: Leaders, Citizens, and the Challenge of Populism in Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2023), Chapters One and Eight ("A Crisis of Democracy?" and "Public Opinion and Democratic Politics"), pp. 1-16, 216-238. (39 pp.)

Paul Pierson and Jacob Hacker, *Let them Eat Tweets: How the Right Rules in an Era of Extreme Inequality* (New York: Norton, 2023), Chapters 1 and 5 ("The Conservative Dilemma" and "A Very Civil War"), pp. 17- 40, 141-168. (50 pp.) or alternatively the following podcast <https://youtu.be/Xz-dy7YbG2I>.

Luca Manucci, "Populism and the Media," *The Oxford handbook of populism* C. R. Kaltwasser, ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 467-488. (20 pp.)

Giovanni Russonello, "Why Most Americans Support the Protests," *The New York Times* (June 5, 2020). <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/05/us/politics/polling-george-floyd-protests-racism.html> (1 p.)

Russell Contreras, "[Support for Black Lives Matter Movement Lowest in 3 Years](#)," *Axios Latino* (June 14, 2023).

### **Suggested:**

Anna Grzymala-Busse, "The Failure of Europe's Mainstream Parties," *Journal of Democracy* 30:4, Oct. 2019, pp. 35-47. (13 pp.)

Weyland, K. (2017). "Populism: A Political-Strategic Approach," *The Oxford handbook of populism*. C. R. Kaltwasser, ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 48-72. (25 pp.)

POPULIST...IO ARTICLES...

### **Week 6 (9 October) – EXTREME-RIGHT POPULISTS IN GOVERNMENT (132 pp.)**

***When parties with distinct extreme-right populist ideology enter electoral politics or government, what factors shape how much impact they have on political rhetoric? On democratic political institutions? On concrete and consequential policy outcomes? Why might that impact differ across countries, issues, time and individual leaders? How much do we know about the concrete impact of extreme-right populism? What do the demand- and supply-side theories we discussed in the last two weeks suggest about its likely influence?***

Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page (2014). "Testing theories of American politics: Elites, interest groups, and average citizens," *Perspectives on Politics* 12 (3): 564-581. (16 pp.)

Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, *How Democracies Die*. New York, Crown Publishing, (2018), Introduction and Chapters 1 and 8. (pp. 1-32, 176-203) (60 pp.)

Takis Pappas "Populists in Power," *Journal of Democracy* (2019) 30 (2): 70-83. (14 pp.)

Michelle Hale Williams, "The Political Impact of the Extreme-right," (Chapter 16) in Jens Rydgren, ed. *The Oxford Handbook of the Extreme-right* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 305-326 (22 pp.)

Sandra Destradi, et al. "Populism and foreign policy: a research agenda (Introduction)," *Comparative European Politics* (2021), pp. 663-682. (20 pp.)

**Suggested:**

B. Verbeek and A. Zaslove, "Populism and Foreign Policy," C. R. Kaltwasser, P. Taggart,

P. O. Espejo and P. Ostiguy, eds. *Oxford Handbook of Populism*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, (2017), pp. 384-405. (22 pp.)

**Week 7 (23 October) – SPECIFIC CASES AND COUNTRIES (TBD) –**

***The next three weeks will be devoted to readings and discussion on the relationship between extreme-right populism and foreign policy in three specific countries or issues. We in the class will decide the topics collectively.***

***Some possible topics might include:***

- ***The Global South: Extreme-Right Populism in Indian Foreign Policy***
- ***Migration Policy***
- ***Euroscepticism and the European Union***
- ***Managing Western Global Competition with Russia and China***
- ***What's the Matter with Sweden, Denmark and Finland?***
- ***The Extreme-Right and Global Climate Change***
- ***Politics in the Former Yugoslavia***
- ***Extreme Left-Wing Populism***
- ***Latin American Extreme Populism***
- ***East European Populism: Hungary, Poland***
- ***Authoritarian Populism***

***Here is an example: Who supported Brexit and why did they do so? What did they think or know? Who influenced them? For what reasons did this coalition prevail in British politics? What broader short- and long-term impact did Brexit have on British foreign policy? Is Brexit reversible? Is this a form of "English Exceptionalism," or is "exiting" the European Union (or other consequential international organizations) a more general problem? Who advocates following Britain and why? How did the EU, the US and others respond to Brexit? How much power did Britain have in the negotiations with the EU? What have been the net effects on the real economy and people's lives? Who gained and who lost from Brexit?***

Copsey, N. and T. Haughton, "Farewell Britannia: Issue Capture and the Politics of David Cameron's 2013 EU Referendum Pledge." *J. Common Mkt. Stud.* 52 (2014), pp. 74-89. (15 pp.)

Hobolt, S. B., "The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent." *Journal of European Public Policy* 23(9) (2016), pp. 1259-1277. (19 pp.)

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977/1989), Chapter One ("Interdependence in World Politics"), pp. 3-22 (20 pp.).  
Stefaan de Rynck, *Inside the Deal: How the EU Got Brexit Done*, Agenda Publishing (2023) pp. 1-7, 225-239, 240ff. ("Chronology" "Introduction," Chapter 15, "Conclusion") (30 pp.)

Charles Grant, *A European Strategy for Labour* (London: Center for European Reform, 2023).  
<https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2023/european-strategy-labour>

Möller, A. and D. Pardijs (2017). The future shape of Europe: A critical mass of countries agree on the need for more flexible cooperation, but what could it look like." *Flash Scorecard*. Berlin, ECFR. [https://ecfr.eu/special/the\\_future\\_shape\\_of\\_europe/](https://ecfr.eu/special/the_future_shape_of_europe/) (10 pp.)

Castle, Stephen. (2023). "Diplomat Who Faced Brexit Freeze in U.K. Now Sees a 'New Beginning' As the European Union's first ambassador in London, João Vale de Almeida had to fight even for official recognition. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and the Windsor Framework are changing things," *New York Times* (4 March). (3 pp.)  
<https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/04/world/europe/uk-eu-northern-ireland.html>

Wager, A. and S. Stowers "Commentary: A year in Brexit: five charts exploring how public opinion on the EU has changed in 2020," *UK in a Changing Europe* (2 January 2023), at <https://ukandeu.ac.uk/a-year-in-brexit-five-charts-exploring-how-public-opinion-on-theeu-has-changed-in-2022/> (7 pp.)

Sumption, M., et al. (2023). *Net Migration to the UK*. Oxford, The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford. (10 pp.)

Hungarian Government, (2018). "The United Kingdom's Negotiations on Withdrawal from the European Union (Brexit)." From the *Hungarian Government Website*,  
<https://brexit.kormany.hu/en>. (3 pp.)

**Suggested:**

Hawkins, B. *Deconstructing Brexit Discourses: Embedded Euroscepticism, Fantasy Objects and the United Kingdom's Vote to Leave the European Union*. New York, Routledge, 2022, Chapters 9 and 10 (pp 142-174). (33 pp.)

**Week 8 (30 October) – SPECIFIC CASES AND COUNTRIES 2**

**Week 9 (6 November) – SPECIFIC CASES AND COUNTRIES 3**

**Week 10 (13 November) – HOW TO PROMOTE AND OPPOSE EXTREME-RIGHT POPULISM**

***Given the analysis and evidence concerning the causes and consequences of extreme-right populism we have seen so far in this course, as well as additional readings here, what steps might their political opponents take to combat them most efficiently? What are the advantages and disadvantages of simply ignoring them? Seeking to exclude or ban them from politics? Alter issue positions to positions closer to theirs? Adopt one's own populist appeals? Form coalitions with them? Sanctioning them internationally? Engaging in counter-propaganda or cyber warfare? Students will brief the class on alternative options.***

<https://www.cnn.com/videos/business/2024/01/31/deepfake-ai-warnings-donnie-osullivan-pkg-vpx.cnn>

Gjesdal, A. (2023). "Introduction: public justification, legitimacy, and social trust." *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 26(4): 579-584.

Mutz, D. C. (2023). "An empirical perspective on improving trust in a polarized age." *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 26(4): 585-592.

Kukathas, C. (2023). "'Kevin Vallier' Trust in a Polarized Age." *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 26(4): 601-607.

Jon Bateman and Dean Jackson, *Countering Disinformation Effectively: An Evidence-based Policy Guide* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 2024).

Noelle Molé Liston, *The Truth Society: Science, Disinformation, and Politics in Berlusconi's Italy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020), Chapter 1, pp. 31-51.

**Week 11 (20 November) – PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF PAPERS**

**Week 12 (4 December) – PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF PAPERS**