

**Berkeley Initiative for Transparency in the
Social Sciences (BITSS) – December 2013**

The Revolution in Qualitative Methods: Active Citation

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A Crisis in Qualitative Political Science

■ QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS IMPORTANT

- 80% of comparative politics scholars and a plurality of (IR) scholars *primarily* utilize case studies
- 90% of political scientists use *some* qualitative analysis
- Most statistical work rests on qualitative coding
- Qualitative work is often judged more policy-relevant

■ BUT NOT SUSTAINABLE

- Quality, area/functional skill, and rigor are declining
- Scholarship is rarely replicable, so qualitative scholars cannot demonstrate excellence
- The number and prestige of qualitative scholars is declining (e.g. journals, faculty, gatekeeping positions)
- Neighboring fields (political, social, economic history) in crisis

Transparency is an ideal shared by all scholars

“The idea is to try to give all the information to help others to judge the value of your contribution; not just the information that leads to judgment in one particular direction or another.”



-- Richard P. Feynman

New APSA

Professional Guidelines for Research Transparency

For evidence-based knowledge claims, researchers should achieve *research transparency*:

- ***Data Transparency:*** Provide direct access to data.
- ***Analytic Transparency:*** Explicate the links between evidence and descriptive or causal inferences.
- ***Production Transparency:*** Explain procedures employed to select data, theories, and methods.

One of Many Responses: Greater Transparency in Qualitative Analysis via Active Citation

- **ACTIVE CITATION**

- Footnotes are hyperlinked to precisely cited, fully annotated source excerpts, placed in appendix

- **QUALITATIVE DATA ARCHIVING**

- **EXPLICIT METHODOLOGICAL STANDARDS**
(e.g. Case selection, counterfactuals, analytic narratives, etc.)

WHAT IS “ACTIVE CITATION”?

EXISTING FORMATS

CONTESTABLE
KNOWLEDGE-
BASED CLAIM
(MAIN TEXT)



CITATION



NEW TRANSPARENCY APPENDIX

A SINGLE ENTRY IN
THE TRANSPARENCY
APPENDIX

1. ANNOTATION
2. SOURCE EXCERPT
3. FULL CITATION
4. SCAN OR LINK TO
SOURCE (OPTIONAL)

An Example of Active Citation



~~Tommy Lee Jones~~ on ~~the Thirteenth~~ ~~Amendment~~ the Thirteenth Amendment



“The greatest measure of the nineteenth century was passed by corruption, aided and abetted by the purest man in America.”

...according to Steven Spielberg, who got it from historian Fawn Brodie (1959), who got it from popular lecturer James Scovel (1898), who may or may not have witnessed it 33 years before...

An Example of Active Citation

The Main Text

In Steven Spielberg's recent film *Lincoln*, the abolitionist Representative Thaddeus Stevens (played by Tommy Lee Jones) returns home after the House of Representatives has passed the Thirteenth Amendment (banning slavery). He utters the following striking phrase to his mulatto common-law wife, Lydia Smith, referring to Lincoln's role in the passage of the amendment: "The greatest measure of the nineteenth century [was] passed by corruption, aided and abetted by the purest man in America." The accuracy of this account has been questioned. An early written account, written 33 years after the fact, suggests that Stevens may have said this. Yet if he did, he almost certainly did not do so at home to his companion. FN: [James Scovel, "Thaddeus Stevens," *Lippincott's Monthly Magazine* \(April 1898\), pp. 548-550.](#)

AN EXAMPLE Part 1 of 4: Annotation

The first known reference to Steven's "aided and abetted" statement appeared in 1898. James M. Scovel, a former New Jersey politician and lawyer, recalled it as part of an ironic reflection by Stevens on Lincoln's willingness to trade votes against a NY to Washington railway (which Stevens favored) for votes in favor of the Thirteenth Amendment. Scovel claims that Stevens said this to him in the 1860s. Is he reliable on this point? On the positive side, Scovel qualifies as a possible eyewitness. Nothing contradicts Scovel's claim to have known Stevens. He was a Washington insider and a confidant of Lincoln, working under him as a Commissioner. His account contains plausible details, including a story Stevens allegedly told him about the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment and an anecdote about witnessing the Representative gamble. The "aided and abetted" statement is the type of pointed remark Stevens was famous for uttering. On the negative side, Scovel did not publish this account until 1898, at the age of 65. He was then making his living as a traveling evangelist and popular lecturer on Lincoln's day, after having been driven out of law and politics in part due to his reputation for shady dealing. Some historians cite the quotation without comment; others ignore it. In any case, even Scovel's account implies no connection between the quotation and Lydia Smith, Stevens' alleged common-law wife, though she is mentioned in the text. Moreover, it is unclear how anyone except Smith herself, who was very discrete and left no memoirs, would have known if Stevens had said it to her alone.

AN EXAMPLE Part 2 of 4: Textual Excerpt

To the writer of this sketch Mr. Stevens told the story of the legislation which gave to the black man his right to vote: ... [548]

His favorite amusement was...to spend the evening at Hall and Pemberton's Faro Bank...and over canvas-back and Veuve Clicquot champagne woo unmolested the goddess of fortune....Stevens was never a heavy player, although I have seen him win fourteen hundred dollars on a twenty-dollar gold-piece as his only stake... [549]

Influence from the White House secured votes against a favorite measure of Mr. Stevens for an air-line railway from Washington to New York, and...these same votes helped Mr. Lincoln's great amendment for emancipation. Of this legislative bargain Stevens said, 'The greatest measure of the nineteenth century was passed by corruption, aided and abetted by the purest man in America.'

During the last thirty years of his life its unwritten romance was the unselfish and tender devotion with which Stevens was attended by Lydia Smith, a mulatto, who in her youth had great beauty of person. [550]

AN EXAMPLE

Part 3 of 4: Full Citation

James Scovel, “Thaddeus Stevens,” *Lippincott’s Monthly Magazine* (April 1898), pp. 548-550.

AN EXAMPLE

Part 4 of 4: Scan or Link (Optional)

Influence from the White House secured votes against a favorite measure of Mr. Stevens for an air-line railway from Washington to New York, and, as the Rialto of Congress "hath its merchandise," these same votes helped Mr. Lincoln's great amendment for emancipation. Of this legislative bargain Stevens said, "The greatest measure of the nineteenth century was passed by corruption, aided and abetted by the purest man in America."

During the last thirty years of his life its unwritten romance was the unselfish and tender devotion with which Stevens was attended by Lydia Smith, a mulatto, who in her youth had great beauty of person. Her fidelity to his interests ended only with his death. He left her five thousand dollars in his will, but she had improved her opportunities and by prudent investments in Washington real estate amassed a considerable fortune. She purchased Stevens's old home in Lancaster, a two-story brick house, in which he lived till his constituents, grateful for his fidelity, returned him to Congress in 1859.


Active Citation: Benefits of Transparency

- ***Accountability:*** Readers can cost-effectively check, critique and debate research. (“one click”)
- ***Assessment:*** Qualitative scholars can demonstrate substantive, theoretical and methodological excellence.
- ***Pedagogy:*** Students can learn these skills.
- ***Public Goods Provision:*** Evidence can be reused.
- ***Interdisciplinarity and Policy Relevance:*** Work with other fields can expand (history, law), and can better impact journalism and public policy.

Active Citation: The Advancing Agenda

- Secured NSF and other funding
- Published articles, developed proposals, held workshops and sponsored panel discussions to refine standard
- Worked alongside quantitative scholars to promulgate new APSA standards
- Integrated progress into summer training institute and graduate seminars
- Fully addressing legal, human subject, and logistical issues
- Creating demonstration website
 - 20+ scholars retrofitting “classic” articles and chapters
 - Younger scholars preparing new and forthcoming work
- Cooperating with journals to embed the standard
- Expanding training and outreach: Pedagogy and standard-setting
- Establishing interdisciplinary links and exchange with policy world
- Designing new plug-in software

ACE Word Add-in




OUTPUT:

- Word Document
- Web Document
- Database (Access, Atlas...)

Digitalized Citation is already all around us

- Academia
- Natural Sciences
- Legal Academia
- Policy Analysis
- Journalism
- Government Documents

Best Practices: Political Science



ments reveals that the Soviets apparently believed that Zhou's complaint about Pyongyang's intentional exclusion of Beijing from the decision process was quite justified. In an initial draft of a September 20 telegram to China on the subject, Gromyko criticized as "entirely mistaken" the North Korean leadership's reluctance to "conscientiously inform the Chinese Comrades of the military situation and all the decisions the Korean commanders and political leadership made regarding issues arising in the course of military operations." In this initial draft Gromyko wrote that he believed that Kim Il-sung himself "must correct this point." Gromyko did not, however, transmit this draft to Beijing. The telegram that was actually sent was quite different and was almost certainly geared toward manipulation of the alliance to minimize China's anger at Pyongyang and to maximize the chance that Beijing would still come to its defense if and when needed. In the revised telegram the situation is described more neutrally as "not right" (or "abnormal") but then is quickly explained away by reference to the "weak links" that the central command in North Korea has with its front lines. Gromyko says this situation arose because of technical difficulties not because the "Korean Comrades are unwilling" to share information with the Chinese.³⁸

³⁸ "Geweimike Guanyu Dui Zhou Enlai de Dafu Zhi Weishen Dian" [Gromyko's Telegram to Roschin Regarding a Reply to Zhou Enlai], Sept. 20, 1950, in Shen, ed. *Chaoxian Zhanzheng*, 2:542–44. Shen offers full texts of both the telegram as sent and the original draft. Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim," 7, discusses only the final draft and describes it as a telegram from Stalin, rather than Gromyko. Moreover he seems to take at face value the explanations of the "abnormal" conditions in which Kim Il-sung is unable to inform his Chinese comrades of his activities. In the Chinese version of the original draft, the situation is described as something Kim Il-sung can fix and as *wanquan cuowu de* (totally mistaken), as opposed to the final version's *bu zhengque de* (not right), translated as "abnormal" by Mansourov.

Best Practices: Natural Science

Example: When did
Polar Bears Evolve?

(Also OSTP)

[Article](#)

[Supplementary Materials](#)



Best Practices: Legal Academia (Yale On-Line Law Review)

be going through at the present moment.

For reasons that I will explain in this Essay, I believe that we may be undergoing a transformation that is every bit as fundamental as those that we once went through when first transitioning from hunter-gatherer forms of life (which did not yet have legal systems or engage a distinctive sense of legal obligation²) to more sedentary forms of agricultural living with larger population densities, incipient domestic legal institutions, and—ultimately—an emergent distinction between morality and law.³ We are so used to where we are today, however, that we sometimes forget what it took to get us here, and it can be especially difficult to see what is happening when we are right in the midst of such a process. I have nevertheless made some recent efforts to reconstruct that earlier process, and my examinations suggest that the transformation was not likely based in reasoning alone, but rather emerged as part of a larger set of sociocultural and linguistic developments among a small handful of cultural traditions at first. These developments began the transition in the ancient world and then caused it to spread thereafter to many other regions.⁴ The relevant processes appear to have involved the slow coevolution of a specific and reciprocally reinforcing set of institutions and practical attitudes within these pioneering cultural traditions, which were sufficient to maintain distinctively new legal orders—along with a distinctive and emergent sense of domestic legal obligation to animate them—in equilibrium.⁵

Over the last several centuries, an analogous transformation has—in my view—been taking place with respect to the emergence of international law. More specifically, I believe that the phenomena that Hathaway and Shapiro have recently called “outcasting” have been coevolving with, and helping to produce the emergence and stability of, a distinctive set of practical attitudes in us. These practical attitudes have, in turn, begun to infuse us with a special sense of international legal obligation, which is capable of animating both those same outcasting practices and an emergent international legal order. Although this process is not yet complete, it would appear to be picking up steam, and—given its importance to our contemporary world—we need to understand this transformation and the focus of current international legal scholarship in several crucial areas.

In Part I, I will employ contemporary devices in metaethics to ask whether international law is law. Although some people take this question to be a question about domestic law, the question could have been asked of domestic law when domestic legal systems first emerged. The question would have undoubtedly seemed (and probably also seems) to be a question about domestic law. In many regions of the world, the domestic version of this question has been asked, and the answer has been “no,”⁸ and I therefore want to get a better sense of what might be the answer to that question. Examinations of this kind can help clarify the question, not only in the case of domestic but also in the case of international law.

The metaethical discussions in Part I will isolate one distinctive dimension of the question, namely, the normative dimension because

Ian Shapiro

Thursday, 21 February 2013

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Reva B. Siegel

Thursday, 21 February 2013

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Kenji Yoshino

Thursday, 21 February 2013

YALE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE ARCHIVE

Volume 122

Footnote 6

Close

“Metaethics is the attempt to understand the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and psychological[] presuppositions and commitments of moral thought, talk, and practice.” Geoff Sayre-McCord, *Metaethics*, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Aug. 29, 2008), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/metaethics>; see also Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard & Peter Railton, *Toward Fin de siècle Ethics: Some Trends, in MORAL DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES* 3, 7 (1997), available at <http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/dbrink/courses/other%20pdf%20articles/DarwallGibbardRailton.pdf> (“We use this term broadly, not assuming that one can avoid normative commitments in doing metaethics and not restricting metaethics to the analysis of moral language; we include under ‘metaethics’ studies of the justification and justifiability of ethical claims as well as their meaning, and also the metaphysics and epistemology of morals, and like matters.”).

Best Practices: Policy Analysis

“High-Value Detainee” Program and Secret Prisons | Andy Worthington - Mozilla Firefox

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15/un-secret-detention-report-part-one-the-cias-high-value-detainee-program-and-secret-prisons/


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CIA Report Hyperlink Footnotes

Next post Previous post

UN Secret Detention Report (Part One): The CIA’s “High-Value Detainee” Program and Secret Prisons

15.6.10



To complement my recent article, “[UN Human Rights Council Discusses Secret Detention Report](#),” in which I explained how, two weeks ago, the UN Human Rights Council had — after some delays — finally discussed the findings of the “Joint Study on Global Practices in Relation to Secret Detention in the Context of Counter-Terrorism,” a detailed, 186-page report issued in February ([PDF](#)), I’m posting the section of the report that deals with US secret detention policies since the 9/11 attacks, in the hope that it might reach a new audience — and provide useful research opportunities — as an HTML document.

I do, however, urge everyone to read the whole report, because the introduction and conclusions are important, as are the sections establishing the legal approach to secret detention and its historical context, the section detailing current practices in 25 other countries worldwide, and the annexes, which contain government responses to a questionnaire about secret detention, and a number of case studies.

Given the length of this section of the report (pp. 43-89), I’m publishing it in three parts. The first, published below, provides an introduction, and deals with “The ‘high-value detainee’ programme and CIA secret detention facilities,” the [second](#) looks at “CIA detention facilities or facilities operated jointly with United States military in battlefield zones,” and the [third](#) looks at “Proxy detention sites,” “Complicity in the practice of secret detention” and “Secret detention and the Obama administration.”

Please note that I have inserted hyperlinks where possible. However, the original report contains footnotes, and not all of these provide links to websites. In most cases, I have added the information contained in the footnotes in square brackets, but for full details, please see the original.

Excerpts from the UN “Joint Study on Global Practices in Relation to Secret Detention in the Context of Counter-Terrorism,” February 2010

Prepared by Martin Scheinin, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Manfred Nowak, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Shaheen Ali, the vice-chair of the Working Group on arbitrary detention, and Jeremy Sarkin, the chair of the Working Group on enforced or involuntary disappearances.

IV. SECRET DETENTION PRACTICES IN THE GLOBAL “WAR ON TERROR” SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001

98. In spite of the prominent role played by the United States of America in the development of international human rights and humanitarian law, and its position as a global leader in the protection of human rights at home and abroad following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. on 11 September 2001, the United States embarked on a process of reducing and removing various human rights and other protection mechanisms through various laws and administrative acts, including the [Authorization for Use of Military Force](#), the USA Patriot Act of 2001, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (which sought to remove habeas corpus rights), as well as various executive orders and memoranda issued by the Office of Legal Counsel that interpreted the position of the United States on a number of issues, including torture. It also sanctioned the establishment of various classified programmes much more narrowly than before [A/HRC/6/17/Add.3, para. 3].

99. The Government of the United States declared a global “war on terror”, in which individuals captured around the world were to be held neither as criminal suspects, put forward for federal court trials in the United States, nor treated as prisoners of war protected by the Geneva Conventions, irrespective of whether they had been captured on the battlefield during what could be qualified as an armed conflict in terms of international humanitarian law. Rather, they were to be treated indiscriminately as “unlawful enemy combatants” who could be held indefinitely without charge or trial or the possibility to challenge the legality of their detention before a court or other judicial authority.

100. On 7 February 2002, the President of the United States issued a memorandum [[PDF](#)] declaring that “common article 3 of Geneva does not apply to either Al-Qaida or Taliban detainees”, that “Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants and, therefore, do not qualify as prisoners of war under article 4 of Geneva”, and that “because Geneva does not apply to our conflict with Al-Qaida, Al-Qaida detainees also do not qualify as prisoners of war”. This unprecedented departure from the Geneva Conventions was to be offset by a promise that, “as a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva”. This detention policy was defended by the Government in various submissions to the United Nations [See for example CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1/Add.1, p. 3; A/HRC/4/41, paras. 453 - 455; and A/HRC/4/40, para. 12], including on 10 October 2007, when the Government stated that the law of war, and not the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, was the applicable legal framework governing the detentions of “enemy combatants” [CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1/Add.1, p. 3], and

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SITUATION REPORT



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A Classified CIA Mea Culpa on Iraq

In this exclusive from the National Security Archive, a secret agency report on its WMD failures is published for the first time.

BY TOM BLANION | SEPTEMBER 3, 2012

This remarkable CIA mea culpa, just declassified this summer and published here for the first time, describes the U.S. intelligence failure on Iraq's non-existent weapons of mass destruction as the consequence of "analytic liabilities" and predispositions that kept analysts from seeing the issue "through an Iraqi prism." The key findings presented in the first page-and-a-half (the only part most policymakers would read) are released almost in full, while the body of the document looks more like Swiss cheese from the many redactions of codewords, sources, and intelligence reports that remain classified even today, seven years after the Iraq Survey Group reported to the Director of Central Intelligence how wrong the previous assessments had been. The key findings do not contain the most striking sentences; instead, these are tucked into the tail-end of the document. For example, on page 14, the assessment reports, "Given Iraq's extensive history of deception and only small changes in outward behavior, analysts did not spend adequate time examining the premise that the Iraqis had undergone a change in their behavior, and that what Iraq was saying by the end of 1995 was, for the most part, accurate." On page 16, going even further, the assessment says, "Analysts tended to focus on what was most important to us -- the hunt for WMD -- and less on what would be most important for a paranoid dictatorship to protect. Viewed through an Iraqi prism, their reputation, their security, their overall technological capabilities, and their status needed to be preserved. Deceptions were perpetrated and detected, but the reasons for these deceptions were misread."

At the [National Security Archive](#), we first saw a reference to this CIA Retrospective Series document in a footnote to a Senate Intelligence Committee report in September 2006, so we immediately filed a Mandatory Declassification Review request for this specific item (MDRs often move through the backlogged declassification system faster than Freedom of Information requests when you have this kind of exact title and date reference to cite). Still, the CIA took almost six years to release the report. How many years to learn the lessons?

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


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Active Citation and Qualitative Transparency: Where to go for more?

<http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/data.html>

amoravcs@princeton.edu

**Berkeley Initiative for Transparency in the
Social Sciences (BITSS) – December 2013**

The Revolution in Qualitative Methods: Active Citation

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